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Summary 
Since its inception, the EU has had a pivotal role in integrating the MS 
between each other and also has had an increasing influence on the 
national legislation of these states. Moreover, this process has naturally 
led to legal concerns on how to interpret the EU law and how to impose 
it to secure its integration for the future. Furthermore, in order to impede 
and hinder MS from protecting and benefiting its own nationals at the 
expense of other MS persons the EU has inserted four fundamental 
freedoms in its major treaties which the MS may not restrict. 
 
Two of these freedoms are the free movement of capital and the freedom 
of establishment, which will hinder MS to impose restrictions to 
establishments and capital movements. Moreover, the provisions of these 
two freedoms frequently overlap each other. Furthermore, because third 
parties may also litigate under the free movement of capital while the 
freedom of establishment may only be invoked by MS parties it is of 
decisive importance to examine how these freedoms interact and if there 
is a dividing line between these two  freedoms. 
 
Concerning direct taxes, this distinction has been of vital importance 
creating a heated debate on this subject and the reach of the free 
movement of capital. Moreover, the ECJ has implemented various 
different and rules for when and how to apply the two freedoms and how 
they interrelate. However, the case law from the ECJ in this field has 
historically been marked by vagueness, complicatedness and 
inconsistency.1 Moreover, this has provided uncertainty in which extent 
third parties may benefit from the inner market and under which 
circumstances only parties from within the EU may invoke the 
fundamental freedoms.  Consequently, this inconsistency has also caused 
national courts in different MS to render decisions that directly 
contravene each other. 
 
In the fall of 2012 the ECJ rendered a landmark decision in this field, the 
FII (II) judgment, which has further sparked debate, but also created 
what  scholars observe to be a more easily interpreted and consistent 
case-law. However, there has been debate on the extent of the principles 
enshrined in this decision and the impact it will have on future case- law. 
Furthermore, some debaters have implies that the FII (II) judgment 
decision have extended the scope of the free movement of capital too far 
and now almost any third party can benefit from the inner market. On the 
other hand, the decision has also been welcomed by other scholars and 
some of them even argue that the scope of the free movement of capital 
should be extended further since that is what the TFEU states and that it 
would also benefit the European economy. 
                                                 
1
 See supplement A for an overview of this inconsistency. 
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Sammanfattning 
Sedan EU bildades har unionen haft en central roll för att integrera 
medlemsstaterna och har också som en effekt av detta haft ett ökande 
inflytande på medlemsstaternas nationella lagstiftning. Dessutom har 
denna utveckling lett till juridiska överväganden avseende hur EU:s 
författningar ska tolkas och verkställas och hur denna integration ska 
kunna säkerställas. Det finns fyra friheter i EU-fördragen som ska 
motverka att de enskilda medlemsstaterna förfördelar personer från 
andra EU-länder med syfte att skydda och gynna personer från den egna 
staten. 
 
Två av dessa friheter är den fria rörligheten för kapital och 
etableringsfriheten, vilka motverkar att medlemsstaterna inför hinder för 
kapitalrörelser och etableringar. Eftersom personer från tredje land kan 
åberopa den fria rörligheten för kapital men inte etableringsfriheten är 
det av stor vikt att utreda hur dessa två friheter förhåller sig till varandra 
och hur gränsen mellan dem ska dras.  
 
Vad gäller direkta skatter har denna gränsdragning varit av stor vikt i 
rättsutvecklingen och skapat en livlig debatt bland praktiker, främst vad 
gäller räckvidden av den fria rörligheten för kapital. Dessutom har EU-
domstolen infört många regler och riktlinjer som ska underlätta 
tolkningen avseende när den fria rörligheten för kapital respektive 
etableringsfriheten kan åberopas och hur de två friheterna påverkar 
varandra. Denna praxis har dock genomsyrats av inkonsekvens, 
komplexitet och otydligheter.2 Detta har i sin tur lett till osäkerhet om i 
vilken grad tredje parter kan vara en del av den inre marknaden och när 
dessa parter inte kan väcka talan mot diskriminerande lagstiftning från 
medlemsstaterna. Denna osäkerhet har också lett till att olika nationella 
domstolar har tolkat den relevanta EU-rätten på fundamentalt olika sätt.  
 
Hösten 2012 kom den avgörande FII (II)-domen från EU-domstolen, 
vilken ytterligare har eldat på den hätska debatten inom ämnet. Den har 
även skapat vad många praktiker anser vara en mer sammanhängande 
och lättförstådd praxis inom ämnet. Dessutom har det också i anslutning 
till denna dom förekommit en debatt om hur långt de principerna som 
kommer till uttryck i domen sträcker sig och vilket inflytande domen 
kommer att ha på framtida praxis. Utöver detta antyder vissa praktiker 
att FII (II)-domen enligt har ökat tillämpningsområdet för den fria 
rörligheten för kapital i den grad att nästan alla tredje parter nu kan ta del 
av den inre marknaden vad gäller direkt beskattning. Det finns emellertid 
forskare som välkomnar domen och dessutom hävdar att 
tillämpningsområdet för den fria rörligheten för kapital borde utökas 
ännu mer då det vore i enlighet med EU-fördragen och hade haft positiva 
effekter på europeisk ekonomi. 
                                                 
2
 See supplement A for an overview of this inconsistency. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
The European Union has had great importance on the legislation of the 
MS and has created an unprecedented integration between European 
countries. Furthermore, this has demanded that the states in the internal 
market give up significant legislative power to the Union. Moreover, to 
make certain that the integration will proceed successfully, the Union 
has been forced to come up with measures to prevent MS to impede the 
legal integration and here the four freedoms have pivotal importance. 
However, the four freedoms have different reaches since the free 
movement of capital also covers third parties and therefore it has created 
a legal uncertainty as how to distinguish the freedoms from each other. 
 
This thesis’s focus is on the difference between the free movement of 
capital and the freedom of establishment.3  As Snell observes in 2011, 
the extension of the free movement of capital to also cover third parties 
is a largely unexplored issue and this issue is characterized by political 
sensitivity, lack of judicial expertise, complexity and possible significant 
financial losses for MS because it allows third parties to benefit from the 
inner market. Moreover, as such the ECJ in its case-law has been 
characterized by its caution and inconsistency in this field and that the 
Court does not apply the same rules as it does in other fields.4  However, 
this is changing since the ECJ with the FII (II) judgment has extended 
the free movement of capital. Nonetheless, the ECJ is still not releasing 
the potential scope of the free movement of capital (see below 3.3). 
Furthermore, this recent change in case-law has been a hot potato in the 
legal jurisprudence. Moreover, the actuality of the topic is also shown by 
that the last year5 there were more than 10 cases decided or pending in 
the ECJ regarding the reach of the free movement of capital. 6 
1.2 Aim and purpose 
The aim of this thesis is to examine if there is a clear distinction and 
dividing line between the free movement of capital and the freedom of 
establishment. If there is such a distinction, this thesis will clarify the 
difference and emphasize important factors in which the two concepts 
are distinct. Furthermore, the aim of this thesis is also to examine how 
these two freedoms interrelate, if one of them has priority and if they 
                                                 
3
 Hereinafter, occasionally I will refer to these freedoms as the two freedoms. 
4
 Snell Free movement of capital: evolution as a non-linear process (hereinafter Snell 
(2011) p. 573 f. 
5
 2013. 
6
 Sheppard Pending Cases in the ECJ: Article 63 TFEU Expands Its Reach (hereinafter 
Sheppard (2013) p. 22 ff.  
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may be applied simultaneously. Moreover, as a consequence of the 
above the purpose of the thesis is as well to analyze if the ECJ applies 
certain rules or guidelines when deciding how the two freedoms 
interrelate and how they are distinguished from each other. If this is the 
case, such rules will also be thoroughly analyzed.  Furthermore, the 
purpose is not only to examine the current legal position of the matter 
concerned but also the legal position in the past to assess if there are any 
patterns in the judgments from the ECJ. The reason for analyzing the 
development of the Court’s case- law would be to see if it can give leads 
to as how to interpret the current legal position of the difference between 
the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment. 
Furthermore, I will also examine clauses that may have great importance 
on this subject, such as the grandfather clause in the TFEU7 and 
ostensible anti-abuse clauses in certain ECJ judgments and assess to 
what extent they might have effect on this subject.   
 
The scopes of the free movement of capital and the freedom of 
establishment often overlap each other, therefore creating necessity in 
distinguishing the difference between them. Moreover, the difference 
between the free movement of services, persons and goods is, in 
principle, purely academic since they all have the same reach and there 
is no difference if certain legislation falls under the scope of one or 
another of those freedoms. However, since the free movement of capital, 
in contrast to the other freedoms, extends its reach to third states it is 
crucial to include it in the analysis. Moreover, I will in this thesis also 
briefly examine how this third party aspect affects the free movement of 
capital and if this aspect might produce any negative consequences.  
 
In 2012 the ECJ delivered a landmark decision (the FII (II) judgment, 
see below 5.2) in this field and as such I will examine that judgment 
more thoughtfully and its impact, scope and influence on future case-
law. To illustrate how this topic has been dealt with in different contexts 
I will also briefly examine how it has been treated in various national 
courts and in one instance how the European Commission has chosen to 
take action against potential discriminating legislation in this field. 
 
Even if most cases in this field concern taxation of dividends this thesis 
will aim for the big picture and also contain other kinds of direct taxation 
such as exit taxes, taxation of dividends and group taxation and to 
examine if all these different kinds of taxes should be examined in the 
same way.  This is, as mentioned, to try to assess if there is a general 
view of how to distinguish between the freedoms and if the difference 
varies according to the particular circumstances. 
                                                 
7
 TFEU art. 64, see also below 2.3.2.  
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1.3 Method and materials 
The method I have chosen is to first examine the pertaining case- law, 
articles, literature and legislation in view of the aim and purpose of this 
thesis and finally analyze to the result of the findings and draw my own 
conclusions. 
 
The aim and purpose of this thesis concern EU tax law and therefore 
different kinds of EU legal acts will have great importance when 
examining the topic relevant to this thesis, such as the treaties and 
directives concerning the fundamental freedoms. Furthermore, national 
court judgments and certain national legal documents will also have 
importance when examining the aim and purpose of this thesis. However, 
the EU legal acts do not in depth provide how to differentiate and 
distinguish the two freedoms from each other and as such this thesis will 
rely heavily on ECJ judgments and scholarly opinions.  
 
Naturally, a significant number of cases involving restrictions of the four 
freedoms also discuss which freedoms apply.  Stemming from this and 
the lack of TFEU provisions on this topic, the inconsistency of the ECJ 
case-law, the wide scope of the free movement of capital and the aim to 
provide a greater picture there is a significant number of Court cases on 
this topic that I will refer to. Furthermore, these include the absolute 
majority of court cases from 2007 and onwards that discuss the topic 
relevant to this thesis. However, because of the large amount of 
judgments, some of these cases may seem superfluous or outdated but 
for the general understanding I have still decided to include them.   
Moreover, in a few cases when I have considered it relevant to the 
purpose of this thesis I have included opinions of different AG’s. 
However, I have not examined ECJ judgments when the Commission 
has taken actions against the legislation of a MS since naturally in these 
cases there are no factual circumstances for the Court to consider and as 
such it gives less room for different interpretations and use of the facts of 
the case-rule (see below 4.2).  
 
Even though the aim of this thesis is to examine the difference between 
the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment I will also 
in some cases examine case- law and articles concerning the difference 
between the other freedoms. This is the case if I am of the opinion that 
they are relevant to the purpose of this thesis and will strengthen my 
argument. Because of my limited knowledge of European languages I 
will in some cases refer to secondary sources that refer to national court 
judgments as well as referring directly to the judgments. 
 
The facts mentioned above in this section in combination with the 
importance of this subject because of the third party aspect have 
produced a hectic debate among legal scholars on this topic. However, 
because of the volatile and ever-changing ECJ case- law, not all writings 
are up-to-date. I have been using articles and parts of articles that I deem 
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are still relevant and useful even if some of them are several years old. 
However, the absolute majority of literature and articles quoted in this 
thesis have been published in 2009 or later.  
 
A substantial number of the authors that I refer to in this thesis all well 
renowned scholars from European Universities. The most quoted author 
in this thesis is Hemels who is a professor at the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam. She wrote an article in European taxation that carefully and 
meticulously examined the EU case law in this field until 2009. Another 
author that I have quoted extensivley is Terra who has written lenghtly 
about EU law and as such his book contains numerous remarks that have 
been valuable for this topic. Furthermore, Nijkeuter who is active at the 
Erasmus University of Rotherdam is also frequently quoted.  The author 
Sheppard is a columnist at Tax Notes International and in that position 
her articles apparently are not always balanced and her language is in my 
opinion sometimes a bit sensational but I have still chosen to incorporate 
her in this thesis in order to include a wide array of views and opinions. 
Moreover, in order to balance the views of certain scholars I have chosen 
to include an additional wide variety of articles and literature.  
1.4 Delimitations 
As the free movement of capital extends its reach to cover third state 
relations I will thoughtfully examine those relations. However, I will not 
focus on how the free movement of capital affects relations with MS’ 
associated and dependent territories, by way of for example the Finnish 
Åland islands or the Portuguese Azores islands.8  Furthermore, I will not 
put great focus on MS restrictions of the separate freedoms but I will 
examine the differences between the freedoms and only focus on the 
restrictions when this is deemed relevant. Nonetheless, although I will in 
some cases examine restrictions to the four freedoms I will not examine 
justifications of those restrictions and what effect third party aspect may 
have on those justifications. Furthermore, I will not examine the rule of 
reason doctrine and what effects it may have on this topic. In the 
provisions on the free movement of capital in the TFEU it is stated that 
under exceptional circumstances9 the European Council may bar third 
parties from invoking the free movement of capital.10 However, these 
provisions will not be discussed because of the extraordinary 
circumstances in which they will apply. 
 
Although taxation of dividends is the most frequent form of taxation in 
the ECJ case- law relevant to this thesis, any aspects of the parent 
subsidiary directive will not be examined.11 Finally, discussions on 
                                                 
8
Terra et al. (2012) p. 81 ff. 
9
 TFEU art. 66. 
10
 TFEU art. 65 (4), art. 66. 
11
 Directive 90/435/EEC. For a discussion on these matters see Englisch Taxation of 
Cross-Border Dividends and EC Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter Englisch (2010) 
p. 201. 
                                              
 9 
double taxation issues occurring as a result of aspects related to this 
thesis will not be examined as well as anti-abuse exceptions to the 
principles and legislation assessed.12 However, this does not include the 
safety/anti-abuse clauses13 in the Fidium Finanz, FII (II) Itelcar and 
DFA judgments (see below 3.2, 5.1.1, 5.2, 5.3) since they have great 
relevance to this thesis and might compensate other parts of the 
judgments and their target may not always be to prevent abuse. 
1.5 Disposition 
I will begin this thesis by explaining the fundamental EU law relevant to 
this topic and give a succinct background to the concerned topic. 
Moreover, I will also give a brief account of how the topic relevant to 
this thesis has been interpreted and executed in some of the MS.  
Furthermore, in the third chapter by referring to ECJ case- law, articles 
and literature, I will thoughtfully examine different methods on how to 
differentiate the free movement of capital from the freedom of 
establishment and how the ECJ case-law historically and currently has 
decided on this matter.  In this chapter I will also examine if there is a 
general order of priority between the two freedoms and the 
interrelationship of the freedoms. In the fourth chapter I will assess the 
different ways of establishing definite influence (see below 3.4), that is 
the deciding factor between the free movement of capital and the 
freedom of establishment. Moreover, in the following chapter I will 
examine the recent trend of the ECJ to extend the reach of the free 
movement of capital. Here great focus will be put to the landmark FII (II) 
case since this judgment has had great impact on the later ECJ case- law 
and the legal debate in this field. Moreover, in the end of the third fourth 
and fifth chapters I will draw my own conclusions of the matters 
discussed in each chapter. 
 
In the sixth and final chapter I will, based on the findings in previous 
chapters, draw my conclusions of matters that could not, because they 
are analyzed on the basis of all concerned chapters together, be analyzed 
in the previous chapters.  However, because of this and to make this 
thesis easily understood, well structured and organized the conclusion in 
the sixth chapter will not reflect the same pattern of organization as the 
thesis as a whole. Moreover, I will also conclude the sixth chapter with 
my final remarks where I will briefly explain my findings in light of the 
                                                 
12
 See Englisch (2010) for discussions regarding double taxat ion and the dividing line 
between the fundamental freedoms and Smit  EU Freedoms, Non-EU Countries and 
Company Taxation: An Overview and Future Prospect (hereinafter Smit (2012) p. 242 
for a d iscussion regarding the topics relevant to this thesis and anti-abuse measures. 
13
 Hereinafter I will refer to these clauses as safety clauses because I think this name 
serves the purpose of this clause right (see below 5.2.3, 5.5.3). It must be pointed out 
that this wording is solely the one of me and I have not encountered it elsewhere. 
Moreover, Nijkeuter refers to this clause as the anti abuse-clause (Nijkeuter (2013) p. 
254.). 
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aim and purpose of this thesis and clarify the current legal position of the 
concerned topic.  
 
Furthermore, every chapter in this thesis will begin with an introduction 
to the concerned chapter and its disposition. Moreover, to make the large 
number of ECJ cases in this thesis more easily understood a graph of 
them and an accumulation of summarized circumstances examined in 
those cases will be found in the supplement.14 However, because of the 
complexness of some cases all relevant circumstances in every case 
might not be put forward in the graph but it will nevertheless provide the 
reader with a general overview. 
 
Explanations and discussions on certain terminology important to this 
thesis will be held where I have considered it relevant. 15 The judgments 
and opinions from the ECJ have been placed where they are relevant and 
not in one specific chapter. Sometimes a certain case has relevance to 
several aspects interesting to the topic of this thesis.  Moreover, in those 
cases I have considered where they are mostly relevant and summarized 
the cases under that section. By way of example some cases that are 
relevant both to chapter three and four have been placed under chapter 
three since they pertain to specific topics concerning the relevance of the 
dominance and definite influence-rule (see below 3.3 and 3.4). Finally, 
case-law from November 201216 and forward has been placed under the 
fifth chapter. The only exception is the Felixstowe case that has been 
placed in the third section because it in a high degree concerns legal 
uncertainties about groups of companies (see below 3.4.3). 
 
Generally in this thesis, comments and observations by scholars will be 
placed where I deem relevant and not in a certain chapter or under 
particular headlines. However numerous observations by scholars will be 
found under the headlines containing the word criticism in the third and 
fourth chapters. Furthermore, criticism of the dominance rule (see below 
3.3.2) is often based on that more considerations should be moved to 
justifications, which is an area outside of this thesis, and as such will be 
briefly explained in footnotes.  
 
 
                                                 
14
 Supplement A. 
15
 For example has the terms generic legislation and groups of companies been 
discussed below in 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 and not in the second chapter where terms pertain ing 
to the TFEU are exp lained. 
16
 When the FII (II) decision was rendered. 
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2 Background 
2.1 General remarks 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the difference of the free movement 
of capital and the freedom of establishment. Furthermore, the ECJ has 
rendered a significant number of much debated decisions relevant to the 
purpose of this thesis. However, the EU Treaties and second directives 
are the most important legal sources in this field since the ECJ case- law 
is based on these sources. Consequently, I will begin this thesis by 
explaining the fundamental freedoms and later examining the definition 
of the two freedoms relevant to this thesis based on the TFEU. 
Furthermore, in the section that concerns the free movement of capital I 
will also thoroughly examine the grandfather clause (see below 2.3.2) 
since it may restrict and have great impact on the recent trend of the ECJ 
to extend the free movement of capital. Furthermore, even if it is partly 
outside the aim of this thesis, the essential function of the fundamental 
freedoms is to prevent restrictions of European integration. Moreover, as 
such I will provide understanding of the topic while also briefly give an 
explanation of the meaning of the concept of restriction. Later in this 
chapter, since essentially the difference between the free movement of 
capital and the freedom of establishment is basically also the difference 
between MS parties and third parties, I will explain who those parties 
are. Finally, because much interpretation of EU law is done by national 
courts I will examine how these courts have interpreted the ECJ case-law 
in this field. 
2.2 Basic EU-law 
The Union law has precedence over national law17; nonetheless the EU 
only has competence on areas exerted upon it in the two treaties, which 
is the case concerning indirect taxation.18 However, these treaties give 
the Union, with a few exceptions, no competence in the field o f direct 
taxation which makes the MS sovereign in this respect of law. 19 
Nonetheless, this competence of the MS must be exercised in 
compliance with EU-law.20 Moreover, national law cannot restrict the 
fundamental freedoms of the EU law: the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital. Furthermore, the freedom of establishment 
                                                 
17
 See C-6/64 Costa v. ENEL, C-26/62 van Gend and Loos. 
18
 TEU and TFEU. 
19
 See TFEU art. 5 & art. 110, Terra et al (2012) p. 9 f. & p. 35 ff., Pelin (2011) p. 131 
ff. 
20
 C-80/94 Wielockx p. 16. The MS direct tax legislation is therefore subject of negative 
integration, contrary to the usual positive integration of MS law (Terra et al. (2012) p. 
36 ff. & p. 876). 
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is included under the free movement of persons.21 However, generally 
regarding the topics examined in this thesis there is no difference 
concerning which freedom a specific situation falls under. This is with 
exception to the free movement of capital that, contrary to the other 
freedoms, also covers situations involving third parties. 22  
2.3 The free movement of capital 
2.3.1 The definition and scope of free 
movement of capital 
The free movement of capital prohibits all restrictions of capital 
between MS and between MS and third states.23 According to 
Schaper the free movement of capital is the most cited freedom 
and cases concerning the free movement of capital decided by the 
ECJ to a large extent concern taxation of dividends. He further 
observes that as of April 2014 out of 267 direct tax cases where 
the ECJ has rendered decisions, 83 have contained references to 
the free movement of capital and that the ECJ has not been clear 
on the scope of this freedom.24 
A directive25 from 1988 contains a non-exhaustive nomenclature 
of situations which is subordinated to the term movement of 
capital. Paragraph I in the annex of the directive reads as 
follows:26 
1. Establishment and extension of branches or new undertakings 
belonging solely to the person providing the capital, and the 
acquisition in full of existing undertakings. 
2. Participation in new or existing undertaking with a view to 
establishing or maintaining lasting economic links. 
3. Long-term loans with a view to establishing or maintaining 
lasting economic links. 
4. Reinvestment of profits with a view to maintaining lasting 
economic links.27 
According to this list the term movement of capital also includes, inter 
alia, investments in property, collective investments, securities, credits 
related to commercial transactions and other financial loans and credits. 
                                                 
21
 See TFEU art. 26 (2), art. 28 (goods), art. 45 (workers), art. 49 (establishment), art. 
56 (services), art. 63 (capital). 
22
 TFEU art. 63 (1), Hemels et al. (2010) p. 20, Ståhl et al. (2011) p. 138.  
23
 TFEU art. 63 – art. 66. 
24
 Schaper 30 Years of Direct Tax Litigation before the Court of Justice of the 
European Union: An Empirical Survey (hereinafter Schaper (2014) p. 236, p. 242 ff & 
p. 263. 
25
 Directive 88/361/EEG. 
26
 C-35/98 Verkooijen p. 27. 
27
 Directive 88/361/EEG Annex I, Paragraph I.  
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The ECJ has observed that this list will provide reference for the 
definition of capital movements and that it is presupposed that dividends 
are included in these definitions.28  
2.3.2 The grandfather clause 
In the TFEU provisions on the free movement of capital there is also the 
grandfather clause29 which states that laws that were enacted prior to 
1994 still may restrict the movement of capital involving direct 
investment – including in real estate – establishment, the provision of 
financial services or the admission of securities to capital markets 
concerning third parties. The graph below also explains when the 
grandfather clause is applicable: 
 
 
Yes                          Yes                          Yes                                Yes 
 
 
         
           No                           No                                 
 
 
 
 
 
The term directs investments are thoroughly explained in a 1988 
directive30 and the explanation is summarized in the Holböck judgment 
(see below 4.3.1):  
 
[Direct] investments concerns investments of any kind undertaken by 
natural or legal persons and which serve to establish or maintain lasting 
and direct links between the persons providing the capital and the 
undertakings to which that capital is made available in order to carry 
out an economic activity.31 
 
This provides that the grandfather clause does not cover portfolio 
investments and Nijkeuter observes that its contents and purpose 
probably are not majority interests in companies limited by shares held 
for portfolio investment purposes32. Nijkeuter further comments that in 
order for a factual holding to be regarded as a direct investment decisive 
influence 33is one criterion, the purpose of the investment the other 
criterion. Moreover, Schaper observes that it is the facts of the case-rule 
                                                 
28
 C-35/98 Verkooijen p. 27 f., C-222/97 Trummer and Mayer p. 7. 
29
 TFEU art. 64 (1), also called the standstill clause (Terra et al. (2012) p. 73). 
* Determined by the use of the facts of the case-rule (see below 4.2). 
30
 Directive 88/361/EEC Annex I headline Direct investments. 
31
 C-157/05 Holböck  p. 34. 
32
 Nijkeuter FII 2 and the Applicable Freedoms of Movement in Third Country 
Situations (hereinafter Nijkeuter (2013) p. 256.  
33
 Nijkeuter (2013) p. 256. 
Third 
parties? 
Free       
movement 
of capital? 
Direct   
investments?* 
 
 
 
Legislation 
grandfathered 
                               
                                           Legislation not grandfathered 
Legislation 
enacted before 
1994? 
No No o No 
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(see below 4.2) that shall be applied when determining if the grandfather 
clause will apply and that out of the 267 direct tax cases brought before 
the ECJ, five have contained references to the grandfather clause.34 
However, Nijkeuter observes that the grandfather clause and the 
distinction between different kinds of investments will be important in 
the future. 35 
 
Smit observes the grandfather clause provides progressive liberalization 
and that the reason behind the clause was that MS were afraid of the lack 
of reciprocity and wanted to preserve sovereignty as regards the free 
movement of capital when third parties are involved. Furthermore, other 
reasons were to prevent major and undesirable acquisitions of MS parties 
by third persons, preserve existing OECD and EU legislation, and that 
erga omnes liberalization would hurt the EU’s external and international 
relations. Smit concludes that, despite the ECJ case-law on this field no 
circumstances indicate that the purpose of the clause was to maintain tax 
sovereignty as regards to corporate income tax and that it aims at 
relatively major third person investments.36 The grandfather clause also 
applies to legislation that has been amended after 1994 but without 
loosing its original meaning.37  
2.3.3 The free movement of capital and third 
relations 
In inter-EU relations there is mostly a symbolic difference between the 
free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment. However, 
while the freedom of establishment only applies to subjects in MS third 
parties are covered by the scope of the free movement of capital as long 
as the discriminated undertakings are located in a MS.38 
 
The ECJ has once acknowledged that third parties are not a part of the 
EU, its laws and obligations and are in a different legal context39 and as 
such some few third situations may not be comparable (see below 2.5).  
However this is in regards to special circumstances and the ECJ  in that 
case and later cases firmly rejected arguments pertaining to that there is a 
lack of reciprocal rights and that extending capital movements would 
impair the free trade negotiations with third states and hurt the tax base 
of the MS. Moreover, this is because, according to the ECJ, concerning 
capital movements third parties are almost always in comparable 
situations and the MS parties themselves extended capital movements to 
                                                 
34
 Of these five cases, three are examined in this thesis, see below C-446/04 FII (I) 
4.2.1, C-157/05 Holböck, C-436/08 & C-437/08 Haribo & Salinen 4.3.1. 
35
 Schaper (2014) p. 236, p. 242 & p. 245, Nijkeuter et al. (2013) p. 256. 
36
 Smit (2012) p. 244 f. 
37
 C-446/04 FII (I) p. 192. 
38
 Cordewener Free movement of Capital between EU member states and Third 
Countries: How Far Has the Door Been Closed?  (hereinafter Cordewener (2009) p. 
261. 
39
 C-101/05 A  p. 36 f., see also Terra et el. (2012) p. 73 ff. 
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also comprise third parties.40  However,  Lang observes that in third 
country situations different rules may apply and in the future the ECJ 
may find that some third parties are not in a comparable situation due to 
lack of reciprocal rights.41  
 
Terra observes that the ECJ is restricting the free movement of capital by 
applying the dominance rule (see below 3.3.1). This is to avoid that third 
parties, by using the free movement of capital, enters the internal market 
through the back door42. Terra further observes that establishments 
usually include movements of capital but that it is more seldom that 
capital movement includes establishments. Furthermore, if the scope of 
the movement of capital would be too wide it would unilaterally grant 
third parties access to the internal market and that is obviously not the 
original intention of the MS and would yield improper results. For 
example, the EU would have an unfavorable negotiating position in the 
WTO.43 
2.4 The freedom of establishment 
The rules regarding the freedom of establishment are wide and prohibit 
any restriction for a person in one MS to set up an establishment in 
another MS.44 The prohibition also covers any restriction of MS to 
restrict persons from other MS to set up agencies, branches or subsidies 
by persons from other MS. 45 Moreover, Schaper observes that as of 
April 2014 out of 267 direct tax cases handled by the ECJ 82 have 
contained a reference to the freedom of establishment.46 
 
 The freedom of establishment both covers taking-up and pursuing 
activities including primary and secondary establishment. Primary 
establishment is when a person establishes a new person in another MS 
or when a judicial person in its entirety is moved from one MS to 
another. Moreover, the term secondary establishment refers to when a 
subsidiary or similar is established in another MS.  Furthermore, for the 
right of secondary establishment it is required that the person setting up 
the establishment is a European Union citizen and that the person 
already is established in a MS. According to TFEU persons who are 
formed in accordance with the law in a MS and have their central 
                                                 
40
 C-101/05 A  p. 29 – p. 31 & p.  36 f., C-436/08 & C-437/08 Haribo & Salinen p.129 
ff. see also C-72/09 Rimbaud, Terra et al. (2012) p. 73 ff. The court has also in these 
cases observed that restrictions to third parties may in under some circumstances be 
justified in a higher extent. However, this falls outside the scope of this thesis, see 
nonetheless this thesis foot. 82, foot. 87, foot. 125, foot. 188 & foot. 226.  
41
 Lang et al. (2013) p. 69. 
42
 Terra et al. (2012) p. 79, see also 5.2.2.  
43
 See Terra et al. (2012) p. 79. 
44
 TFEU art. 49 – art. 55, see also below 3.4 for how the ECJ examines if the Free 
movement of capital will apply.  
45
 Gebhard C-55/94 p. 25. 
46
 Schaper et al. (2014) p. 236 & p. 242.  
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administration, registered office or principal base of business within the 
Union shall be treated in the same way as European Union citizens. 47 
 
Hindrance to the freedom of establishment may appear both in the state 
of establishment and in the state of residence. The state of establishment 
is the place where a person set up an establishment and uses his/her right 
of freedom of establishment. The state of residence is a person’s country 
of origin.48 In 1994 the ECJ observed that the purpose of freedom of 
establishment is just to ensure the right for, legal and natural, persons in 
the inner market to establish themselves in other MS. Moreover, this 
further emphasizes that the freedom of establishment only applies in 
strict inner market situations.49  
2.5 Restrictions to the fundamental 
freedoms 
A national legislation is restricting persons of other MS or third parties if 
the legislation constitutes a differential adverse treatment and persons 
not subjected to the adverse treatment and the discriminated parties are 
in comparable situations.50 Moreover, tax restrictions to the fundamental 
freedoms can appear both in the resident and non-resident state and the 
ECJ does not, in principle, differentiate between these situations. 
Furthermore, at least in the direct tax field, the assessment if it exists a 
restriction is the same regardless of freedom, including the treatment 
between MS parties and third parties.51 
2.6 The difference between MS parties 
and third parties 
Since the free movement of capital, in contrast to the freedom of 
establishment, also covers third parties it is essential to define what a 
third party is. The MS are mentioned in the TFEU52 and countries not 
mentioned in the treaty will by way of analogy be considered as third 
states. Moreover, it is in the jurisdiction of the MS to determine, while 
not opposing EU-law, what persons will be considered nationals of that 
MS.53 
                                                 
47
 TFEU art. 54, Ståhl et al. (2011) p. 100 f., Gebhard C-55/94 p. 25 & p. 32. 
48
 Ståhl et al. (2011) p. 103. 
49
 Opin ion 1/94 p. 81. 
50
 The assessment if the parties are in comparab le situations must focus on the 
concerned legislation and not the parties (Ståhl et al. (2011) p. 135 f. & p. 146, C-
512/03 Blanckaert, C-376/03 D.  
51
 Ståhl et al. (2011) p. 134 f., p. 140 & p. 146, C-513/04 Kerckhaert and Morres p. 16 
& p. 29. 
C-279/93 Schumacker. 
52
TFEU article 52 (1). 
53
 C-369/90 Micheletti p. 10, C-210/06 Cartesio p. 110, Smit (2012) p. 236. As for 
associated and dependent territories; this aspect falls outside the scope of this thesis. 
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2.7 The fundamental freedoms and the 
national situation 
MS must interpret their law in conformity with EU-law.54 Moreover, if 
national courts make a ruling that in some way concerns EU law they 
can rule, without first referring the case to the ECJ, if they are certain in 
their way of  applying the EU legislation and are convinced that other 
national courts would be certain in the same way, ie. it must be an acte 
clair.55 
 
The national case- law in this field has been characterized by 
inconsistencies and courts have often ruled in this area of tax law 
without first referring the case to the ECJ. However, these 
inconsistencies might be the result of conflicting and not always clear 
ECJ case- law regarding the differences between the four freedoms.56 
French and German courts have in 2008 and 2009 ruled in accordance 
with the purpose of the legislation-rule (see below 4.3).57 However, the 
Dutch Supreme Court ruled in favor of the facts of the case-rule (see 
below 4.2) in three cases, even after the judgments in the other national 
courts.58 Hemels observed that these rulings are problematic in that the 
national courts seem to interpret the concerned ECJ case- law as an acte 
clair and that more cases needs to be referred to the ECJ. 59 Furthermore, 
Cordewener 2009 observes that  
 
legal practice in twenty-seven [MS] urgently needs clear guidelines 
regarding the obligations flowing from Article 56(1) EC [TFEU art. 63], 
in particular, as they have to handle not only foreign investments of their 
own inhabitants and corporations but also capital flows streaming into 
the EU from the rest of the world.60 
The recently enacted Swedish thin cap rules have been the subject of 
scrutiny by the European Commission. These thin cap rules concern 
                                                                                                                      
However, they have sometimes been referred to as MS (Smit  (2012) p. 237, Smit 
(2012) p. 237 foot. 39 – foot. 44). For a d iscussion if persons indirectly held by third 
parties are considered third parties see above 2.4, below 3.4.3.  
54
 C-14/83 Von Colson, C-106/89 Marleasing, Ståhl et al. (2011) p. 36 ff. 
55
 TFEU art. 267, C-283/81 CILFIT p. 15 ff., Hemels et al. Freedom of Establishment 
or Free Movement of Capital: Is There an Order o f Priority? Conflicting visions of 
national courts and the ECJ (hereinafter Hemels (2010) p. 19, Ståhl et al. (2011) p. 29 
f. 
56
 See below supplement A for a graph that shows the inconsistency in the older ECJ 
case law in this field. 
57
 See Bundesfinanzhof, I R 7/08,  I R 95/05, Cour administrative d'appel de Nancy 
No. 07NC00783 , No.07VE00529. 
58
 Hoge Raad No. 43339 BNB 2009/24, No. 43338 BNB 2009/23, No. 43629 VN 
2009/24.11.  
59
 Hemels et al. p. 28 ff., Boer Freedom o f Establishment versus Free Movement of 
Capital: Ongoing Confusion at the ECJ and in the National Courts? (hereinafter Boer 
(2010) p. 256 f. 
60
 Cordewener (2009) p. 263. 
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companies that share a commonality of interests and might be applied on 
holdings as low as just below 50 percent according to the Swedish 
government, 18 percent according to similar Swedish legislation  and 10 
percent according to the Swedish Tax Agency. However, the 
Commission applied the freedom of establishment when it took action 
against these regulations that might involve third parties. Nonetheless, 
Ohlsson observes that these rules might fall under the scope of the free 
movement capital. Moreover, this is since Ohlsson observes that the 
threshold for when legislation confers definite influence (see below 3.4.1) 
is between 10 and 25 percent. 61 
 
                                                 
61
 IL 24:10 a- f §§, Terenius Jilkén, Carina, Väsentligt inflytande och under huvudsak 
gemensam ledning – luddiga begrepp på drift?, esp.  p. 499 & 506, EU PILOT 4437/13 
TAXU Sweden, Prop. 2012/13:1 p. 239, Skatteverkets ställningstagande den 25 
februari 2013 Några frågor vid tillämpningen av ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna 
gällande väsentligt inflytande, undantaget från 10 %-regeln och ventilen, Ohlsson Även 
solen har sina fläckar EU-rättsliga frågetecken kring flera svenska skatteregler 
(hereinafter Ohlsson (2013) p. 11 – p. 24.   
                                              
 19 
3 The interrelationship 
between the freedoms 
3.1 General remarks 
In the previous chapter I examined the EU law relevant to this thesis and 
discussed the definitions of the fundamental freedoms relevant to this 
thesis. However, the TFEU and other provisions did not provide much 
information on the interrelationship between the two freedoms. Below, I 
will first, based on the TFEU and older ECJ case law, give a general 
understanding of the interrelationship between the freedoms. After this, I 
will examine if several freedoms may be applied simultaneously and 
what rules and guidelines the ECJ applies when deciding which freedom 
or freedoms will apply. Furthermore, I will also examine the scholarly 
debate and analyze the prominence of these rules through the recent ECJ 
case-law and legal debate. Moreover, I will based on these findings 
analyze these rules and provide my own opinions on their use. However, 
since the interpretation of the definite influence-rule (see below 3.4) is 
influenced by most parts of this thesis a more thorough discussion on 
when this rule applies will be found in the sixth chapter (see below 6.2).  
3.2 Background 
The TFEU and other EU legislation define the four freedoms and it is 
stated in the TFEU that the provisions regarding the free movement of 
capital shall be without prejudice to the applicability of restrictions on 
the right of establishment which are compatible with the Treaties62. 
However, except this  the EU law does not set up rules on the 
interrelationship of the four freedoms, and more specifically how to 
differentiate from them and if there is an order of priority between the 
fundamental  freedoms.63 However, this question only has greater 
relevance in cases which may fall into the ambit of both the free 
movement of capital and another freedom since the free movement of 
capital is the only freedom that also protects third parties from 
restrictions from MS. Nonetheless, Ståhl observes that the definition of 
movement of capital is broad which leads to circumstances that will fall 
under the scope of more than one freedom.64 
 
Many scholars observe that the ECJ has not been consistent in its ruling 
in this area and that the difference between the two freedoms is an 
                                                 
62
 TFEU art. 65 (2). 
63
 See TFEU, C-452/04 Fidium Finanz p. 32 f. 
64
 Ståhl et al. (2011) p. 138. 
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utterly sensitive political issue that affects many law practitioners. 65 
Moreover, Schaper observes that the difference between the free 
movement of capital and the freedom of establishment is complicated to 
analyze and also has great importance, particularly since the free 
movement of capital extends its reach to third parties. Furthermore, 
Schaper also comments that as of April 2014 out of 267 direct tax 
judgments rendered by the ECJ, 14 of them have referred to both the 
freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital.  Finally, 
Schaper notes that the ECJ has not been consistent in its reasoning 
regarding which fundamental freedoms to apply.66 
 
In the end of 201267 Smit observes that the ECJ apparently, for unclear 
reasons, interprets the free movement of capital in a strict manner which 
widens the scope of the freedom of establishment when it exists factual 
definite influence. Moreover, Smit observes that nothing indicated that 
the ECJ would adopt different methods in strict intra-EU circumstances 
and situations involving third parties in this field.68 
 
In older case- law prior to the ECJ had formulated the principles 
examined later in this chapter the Court chose a different approach 
compared to the more current case- law, these older cases will be 
explained below.  In the Bachmann case from 1992 the ECJ started to 
develop its case- law regarding the interrelationship of the fundamental 
freedoms and put relevance to all freedoms that the referring court 
brought up but without finding one of them being predominant.69 
Moreover, in the following Konle judgment from 1999 the ECJ observed 
that the concerned national tax regulations fell under the scope of both 
the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment.70 
However, the Court only examined the latter freedom and vaguely 
commented that because of the purpose of the legislation (see below 4.1) 
the free movement of capital would apply.71  That same year the ECJ 
ruled in the X and Y case and commented that a factual holding of 90 
percent fell under the scope of freedom of establishment and that it was 
not necessary to assess the free movement of capital without clearly 
giving precedence to one freedom.72 In the later Baars case (see below 
3.4.1) the Court only examined the freedom of establishment73 and after 
finding that it was applicable did not assess the free movement of 
capital.74 
                                                 
65
 See Cordewener (2009) p. 263, Schaper (2014) p. 244 f., Fontana Direct Investments 
and Third Countries: Things are Finally Moving ... in the Wrong Direction  (hereinafter 
Fontana (2007) p. 431, Boer (2010) p. 250 f.  
66
 Schaper (2014) p. 244. 
67
 However, seemingly prior to the C-35/11 FII (II) judgment (see below 5.2.1).  
68
 Smit (2012) p. 238 f. 
69
 C-204/90 Bachmann. 
70
 C-302/97 Konle p. 22. 
71
 C-302/97 Konle p. 39, see also C-275/92 Schindler p. 22, Hemels et al. (2010) p. 20.  
72
 C-200/98 X and Y p. 4, 24, 28 & 30, see also Hemels et al. (2010) p. 20. 
73
 The first freedom mentioned by the referring court (C-251/98 Baars p.1). 
74
 C-251/98 Baars p. 19 ff., see also Hemels et al. (2010) p. 20. 
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3.3 The dominance of one freedom 
3.3.1 Background 
The so called dominance rule has no ground in the TFEU and it provides 
that the ECJ, if there is a restriction to one freedom that freedom will 
prevail and the Court does not continue to also examine another 
freedom.75 The EFTA Court in 2000 started to develop the dominance 
rule and found that the free movement of capital was predominant76 and 
found that it could not apply the freedom to provide services and that 
those two freedoms could not be applied simultaneously. 77 Moreover, 
the dominance rule was more specifically formulated in the Canal 
Satélite Digital case from year 2002 where the ECJ observed that if 
national tax legislation is contrary to two freedoms, the Court will only 
examine the concerned regulation in view of one freedom if the other 
freedom is entirely secondary78.79  
 
The most important case for the establishment of the dominance rule was 
the non-tax case Fidium Finanz from 2006 and it was ruled in Grand 
Chamber which indicates its principal importance.  Moreover, in this 
judgment the ECJ observed that if both the freedom of services and the 
free movement of capital might be affected, one of them will prevail 
over the other. Furthermore, if the relevant tax legislation also falls 
under the scope of the subordinate freedom, this is an unavoidable 
consequence80of the superior freedom. Which freedom will be 
preponderant must be decided on a case-by-case basis in light of the 
purpose of the relevant tax regulations.81  Furthermore, the free 
movement of capital can hence not be implemented alternatively to the 
freedom to provide services and this is even the case regarding persons 
from third countries who will then be unable to invoke any freedom if 
the free movement of capital is not the superior freedom. By way of 
example, if the activities of a third party both falls under the free 
movement of capital and the freedom of establishment she can only 
invoke the free movement of capital if it is the most relevant freedom in 
                                                 
75
Hemels et al. (2010) p. 21 f, TFEU. 
76
 E-1/00 Islandsbanki, esp. p. 32. 
77
 Hemels et al. (2010) p. 22 f., see also C-275/92 Schindler p. 22, C-302/97, Konle p. 
39.  
78
 C-390/99 Canal Satélite digital p. 31. This wording has been used extensively in 
later cases, see, inter alia, Fidium Finanz C-452/04 p. 34, C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome p. 
37. 
79
 C-390/99 Canal Satélite Digital p. 31. 
80
 C-452/04 Fidium Finanz p. 48, see also C-36/02 Omega p. 27, C-196/04 Cadbury 
Schweppes p. 33 for similar wordings. This term orig inated from the AG’s opinion in 
the Thin Cap case where he observed  that effects to the free movement of capital was 
purely an indirect consequence of establishments (C-524/04 Thin Cap opinion p. 36), 
see also C-204/90 Bachmann p. 34. 
81
 C-452/04 Fidium Finanz, esp. p. 45. 
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the case.82 This considerably curbs the scope of the free movement of 
capital and limits the possibility for third country companies to take 
action against discriminatory laws in the MS.83 The dominance rule has 
since been applied in a vast number of later cases and is always applied 
in the current case- law.84 
 
In the Fidium Finanz judgment the ECJ also observed that the German 
tax legislation required operators to have permission to enter the German 
financial market and provide financial services, ie. an obligation to 
establish itself in the German market. Here a third company could hardly 
invoke the free movement of capital to circumvent the strict German 
regulation that meticulously regulated the conditions for entering the 
German market. This was since for access to the German market in this 
respect the freedom of capital clearly was not the most relevant 
freedom.85  
3.3.2 Potential demise of the dominance rule 
and criticism 
Cordewener observes that it has been widely acknowledged that the 
TFEU does not impede the idea that the freedoms could be applied 
simultaneously and especially that the other freedoms may not push 
away the free movement of capital.86 Furthermore, many scholars have 
provided similar criticism. 87  Dahlberg has criticized the dominance rule 
by observing that if the freedom of establishment would be dominant it 
would undermine the material scope of potential situations in which the 
free movement of capital can be applied. Moreover, only in situations 
where the freedom of establishment and the free movement of capital 
would both not be applicable can the free movement of capital be 
invoked in third state-relations.88 Cordewener observes that the ECJ  by 
not applying two freedoms simultaneously has chosen to restrict the 
                                                 
82
 The dominance rule has been criticized by some scholars who argues that there is not 
support in the TFEU for this method and that considerations for opening up the EU too 
much to third markets should be restricted in the justifications instead (see Cordewener 
p. 172 foot. 17, see also this thesis foot. 40, foot. 87, foot. 125,  foot. 188 & foot. 226). 
83
 C-452/04 Fidium Finanz, esp. p. 46 ff., see also C-439/07 KBC. 
84
 See, inter alia, Fidium Finanz C-452/04 p. 34, C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome p. 37, C-
282/12 Itelcar,  C-35/11 FII (II), C-80/12 Felixstowe, C-190/12 DFA , Hemels et al. 
(2010) p. 21. See also supplement A for an overview of the current case-law, where it is 
shown that the dominance rule is currently consistently applied. 
85
 C-452/04 Fidium Finanz p. 46 ff. 
86
 Cordewener et al. Free Movement of Capital and Third Countries: Exploring the 
Outer Boundaries with Lasertec, A and B and Holböck  (hereinafter Cordewener (2007) 
p. 372 f., Cordewener (2009) p. 253. 
87
 See Boer (2010) p. 252, Fontana (2007) p. 431 ff., Dahlberg (2012) p. 398 f, 
Cordewener (2009) p. 256, Boer acknowledges that if third parties can invoke the free 
movement of capital without restrictions it would provide potential hazards but that 
these considerations should be made in the justifications, which is a topic that is outside 
of the scope of this thesis (Boer (2010) p. 252), see also this thesis foot. 40, foot. 82, 
foot. 125, foot. 188 & foot. 226. 
88
 Dahlberg (2012) p. 398 f.  
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scope of the free movement of capital under circumstances where other 
freedoms are primarily affected and making the free movement of capital 
merely an unavoidable consequence of the other freedoms. Moreover, 
Cordewener comments that this approach is remarkable and 
unsatisfactory89 since the TFEU allows certain overlapping of the 
fundamental freedoms.  
 
The cases discussed below in this section only contained MS parties and 
are with one exception90 the only cases in the ECJ case law from 2007 
and onwards in this field where the Court deviated from the dominance 
rule and examined more than one freedom.91 The Columbus Containers 
case from the end of 2007 concerned generic (see below 3.4.2) Belgian 
tax legislation and factual definite influence (see below 4.2) and the 
Court initially observed that definite influence (see below 3.4.1) existed 
and thus the freedom of establishment applied. However, since the Court 
also examined the free movement of capital (the national court asked the 
ECJ to assess both freedoms) it is apparent that it also applied the 
purpose of the legislation-rule (see below 4.3.1). The following Lammers 
case from the beginning of 2008 concerned generic measures and did not 
involve third parties. Moreover, in the case the ECJ examined the 
circumstances and found that first the freedom of establishment should 
be examined.  Moreover, after that the ECJ commented that since the 
Belgian tax legislation was not in compliance with the freedom of 
establishment there was no need to examine the free movement of 
capital.92   
 
In the Truck Center case from December 2008 the national legislation 
required a holding of 25 percent to apply but the concerned company 
owned 48 percent of the shares in the subsidiary.93 The ECJ observed 
that a holding of that magnitude and the concerned legislation conferred 
definite influence and that the freedom of establishment should be 
examined but later commented that regarding the free movement of 
capital it was enough to state that the conclusion in the previous 
paragraphs also to an equal extent applies to the free movement of 
capital.94  The Gaz de France judgment from October 2009 concerned a 
French law that applied on holdings of more than 25 percent and a 
factual situation where there was a wholly owned subsidiary. In this case 
the ECJ first concluded that the concerned French tax legislation 
constituted a restriction to the freedom of establishment but continued 
and observed that the concerned conclusion also could be applied on the 
free movement of capital.95 
                                                 
89
 Cordewener (2009) p. 256. 
90
 C-157/05 Holböck , see below 4.3.1. 
91
 See supplement A for an overview of which cases in the ECJ case-law the Court 
examined or applied both freedoms. 
92
 C-298/05 Columbus Containers, esp. p. 29 – p. 32, C-105/07 Lammers. 
93
 C-282/07 Truck Center p. 10 ff. 
94
 C-282/07 Truck Center p. 29 f. & p. 51, The ECJ in p. 51 referred to  C-446/04 FII 
(I) p. 60 & C-298/05 Columbus Containers p. 56, see also Hemels et al. (2010) p. 25. 
95
 C- 247/8 Gaz de France. 
                                              
 24 
The Accor judgment from 2011 concerned taxation of dividends. 
Furthermore, the ECJ observed in this case that the purpose of the 
legislation was pivotal and commented that a legislation that app lies on 
holdings of 10 percent does not confer definite influence. However, the 
Court noted that the factual circumstances were unclear and therefore 
the concerned legislation had to be examined in regards of the two 
freedoms.96  
3.4 The definite influence-rule 
3.4.1 Background 
The Baars case from 2000 was groundbreaking and established the term 
definite influence97 which has later been applied in most ECJ judgments 
concerning the relationship between the four freedoms.98 The Court 
observed in Baars that if a shareholder has definite influence over a 
subsidiary then the freedom of establishment will be relied upon. In this 
case, the Dutch law applied if there was a holding of more than 33, 33 
percent and Baars fully owned the subsidiary. Furthermore, ECJ found 
that this factual ownership gave the concerned person definite influence 
over the company's decisions and allows him to determine its activities is 
exercising his right of establishment.99  Therefore, the freedom of 
establishment was the dominant freedom.100 
 
In the Überseering Case from 2002 the question only was if a provision 
was under the scope of the freedom of establishment and not about the 
relationship between the different freedoms in the TFEU. In the case the 
ECJ referred to the Baars case and wrote that as a general rule101 
citizens of MS that acquired a MS company will be subject to the free 
movement of capital unless the shareholdings exert definite influence.102 
Moreover, in its following decisions the Court continued to apply the 
definite influence-rule and have done in most cases since then.103 
However, below (3.4.4) those few cases where the Court might not have 
applied the definite influence-rule will be discussed. 
3.4.2 Generic measures 
A generic measure is legislation which covers circumstances that both 
confers and does not confer definite influence. Consequently, this is 
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often regulations that apply irrespective of the extent of a holding in a 
company.  Considering that the ECJ case law regarding what measures 
exert definite influence is volatile so is the term generic measures. 
Moreover, the opposite of a generic measure is a specific measure that 
applies when the national tax regulations only confer definite influence 
or do not exert such influence.104 Furthermore, according to the current 
case-law all legislation that does not only confer definite influence and 
involves third parties will fall under the scope of the free movement of 
capital (see below chapter 5).  
3.4.3 Groups of companies 
Legislation concerning groups of companies, such as legislation 
covering thin cap, CFC, group loss relief, transfer pricing etc. is often 
deemed as exerting definite influence since the very nature of a group of 
company is often that the companies within this group confer definite 
influence.105 This kind of legislation has been examined by the ECJ on 
numerous occasions where the Court has observed that it falls under the 
freedom of establishment, by way of example in the Thin Cap case (see 
below 4.2) where the ECJ observed that  
 
Legislation […] targeted only at relations within a group of companies, 
primarily affects freedom of establishment ad should, accordingly, be 
considered in the light of article 43(emphasis added).106 
 
Similar wordings have been found in numerous ECJ judgments such as 
the FII (I) and Burda cases (see below 4.2.1). Moreover, Hilling and 
Ståhl also observe that national legislation concerning groups of 
companies falls under the scope of the freedom of establishment.107  
However, there have also been borderline cases. The recent Itelcar case 
(see below 5.2 for a discussion on this case) from last year108 concerned 
the Portuguese thin cap legislation that the ECJ observed fell under the 
free movement of capital.109 The Felixstowe case from April 2014 was 
ruled in Grand Chamber which indicates its principal importance. It 
concerned a legislation covering group taxation in the form of group 
relief applied on consortiums where 75 percent of the holdings must be 
held by the consortium members and each holding need to be of the 
extent from 5 to 75 percent of the parent company. Moreover, in this 
case the companies were directly owned by MS parties and indirectly 
owned by third MS parties.  
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The AG commented that in this case the legislation concerned could 
hypothetically cover a consortium with 20 companies each holding a 5 
percent stake, a situation which would not confer definite influence. 
Nonetheless, the AG referred to the FII (II) judgment (see below 5.2) 
and observed that in intra-EU situations, the facts of the case-rule (see 
below 4.2) would still apply. Furthermore, the AG observed that since 
the holdings were indirectly held by the third company through holding 
companies inside the inner market, the concerned companies could still 
invoke the freedom of establishment.110  
 
The ECJ did not discuss which freedom was the applicable freedom and 
applied the freedom of establishment, which was the same freedom the 
question of the referring courts contained. The ECJ further observed that 
the concerned parties were considered MS parties since it was not the 
concerned company but instead the ultimate parent that was a third party 
and the TFEU did not contain any provision that stated the contrary (see 
above 2.4 since this view is supported by the provisions on the freedom 
of establishment).111  
3.4.4 Potential demise of the definite 
influence-rule and criticism  
The definite influence-rule has been the focus of much debate and has 
not always been applied consistently by the ECJ.112 Smit observes that 
from an international tax point of view the definite influence-rule is not 
optimal. Furthermore he comments that putting significant focus to the 
strict standard of definite influence is to not acknowledge genuine 
economic movement. Moreover, these movements stem, according to 
Smit, from the freedom of investment and its pivotal importance in the 
territory of a MS through an establishment including a satisfactory 
amount of independence and management and control within the 
concerned area. Moreover, if this economic movement is performed in 
an activity involving definite influence it should not, according to Smit, 
be material because the only difference between definite influence and 
direct investment (see above 2.3.2) is the amount of influence. However, 
there is no substantial difference because under both circumstances 
genuine economic links are required. Smit concludes that it is from this 
point of view hard to justify that those investments that confer definite 
influence are excluded from the scope of the free movement of capital 
and this opposes the international principle of tax neutrality. 113  
 
Cordewener observes that the definite influence-rule is not a proper 
guideline to determine if the freedom of establishment applies. 
Furthermore, this is because the standard definite influence is in 
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principle the same as according to EU-law the free movement of capital 
will apply when there is possibility of participating effectively in the 
management and control114.115 
 
Hemels observes that in 2009 several AG’s began to question the 
definite influence-rule. Moreover, the HSBC case only involved MS 
parties and in the opinion the AG observed that obstacles on [the] 
freedom of establishment would be a direct consequence of obstacles 
placed in the way of the free movement of capital.116 Hemels draws the 
conclusions that the meaning of the AG would be to first assess the free 
movement of capital and later to examine only the freedom of 
establishment if there is no restriction to the first mentioned freedom. 
Moreover, as such the AG disregards the definite influence-rule 
according to Hemels.  However, the AG also observed that if an intra-
EU cross-border acquisition guarantees definite influence the freedom of 
establishment might be applied. In the same case, the ECJ did not 
examine the fundamental freedoms in the TFEU at all.117  
 
In the Glaxo Wellcome case the shareholder wholly owned the subsidiary 
and the relevant German tax legislation was generic and concerned 
dividends. The ECJ mentioned the definite influence-rule but observed 
that because the aim and spirit of the legislation was to prohibit non-
residents with the sole purpose of obtaining a favorable taxing compared 
to residents and therefore the free movement of capital would prevail. 
Moreover, the ECJ also commented that any restriction to the freedom of 
establishment was an unavoidable consequence of the capital 
movements. The Court further observed that the reach of the free 
movement of capital covers shareholdings which are taking effective 
participation in management and control. Moreover, the AG’s opinion 
was similar to the judgment but he observed that the opinion was only 
relevant in circumstances solely concerning parties from within the 
Union, an observation not found in the ECJ judgment in the same 
case.118   
 
Hemels regards this as a new alternative rule for determining 
predominance that disregards the definite influence-rule since the reason 
for applying the free movement of capital was not the lack of definite 
influence.119 Cordewener observes that the AG in the Glaxo Wellcome 
case is, through the opinion, expressing his dissatisfaction with the at 
that time vague and inconsistent ECJ case-law in the field.120 
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3.5 Conclusions 
3.5.1 The dominance rule 
Since the beginning of the year 2000 the dominance rule has been crucial 
in the ECJ case- law that is relevant to the topic of this thesis and has 
been regularly applied by the ECJ. However, in the Columbus containers 
and Lammers cases the Court examined both freedoms while in the 
Truck Center, Gaz de France, and Accor cases it applied both freedoms 
simultaneously, which shows that the Court went back to reasoning 
similar to that in the Bachman, Konle and X and Y cases.121 This might 
be an effect of non consenting judges and the vague and inconsistent 
case law of the time. Moreover, these cases did not involve third parties 
and as such applying these did not have any effect on the outcome and 
did not provide potential controversial judgments.122 Furthermore, in 
many of these cases the factual circumstances were less clear and as such 
the ECJ may have to chosen both freedoms since the factual 
circumstances may have conferred definite influence. 123 
 
However, the judgments might have also been the effect of that the 
dominance rule has no support in the TFEU and as such the judges 
decided that there was no obstacle in applying both rules simultaneously. 
Furthermore, the cases show that the dominance rule should not be taken 
for granted, even if it has been consistently applied in the current case 
law of the ECJ (see below 5.2, 5.3). 
 
The dominance rule in itself severely curbs the leeway for third parties to 
take action against discriminating national legislation in the MS since 
such parties may only invoke the free movement of capital when that 
freedom is preponderant. If then the Court finds that a freedom other 
than the free movement of capital is more relevant than that third party 
may in no way take action against a discriminating MS legislation. 
However, since 2010 and particularly after the FII (II) case (see below 
5.2) in 2012 the free movement of capital has greatly extended its reach. 
However, this should not be the reason why the Court since 2012 and 
onwards consistently applies the dominance rule (and hence curbing the 
free movement of capital) since third parties were only involved in one 
case where the ECJ deviated from the dominance rule and this case was 
grandfathered (see below 4.3.1).   
 
A considerable number of scholars have criticized the dominance rule on 
the grounds that it is not supported in the TFEU. Moreover, I agree on 
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the fact that it has no support in the TFEU and that it is a problem that 
the ECJ does not base its opinions in the TFEU. However,  I still am of 
the opinion that it makes judgments of the ECJ that are not always easily 
understood more comprehensible since then we know that the Court will 
only apply one freedom.  Moreover, this is instead of simultaneously 
examining two or more freedoms, an action that would further 
complicate judgments on this matter.124 Cordewener and Dahlberg also 
criticize the dominance rule for undermining the scope of the free 
movement of capital. However, while this was the case in earlier case 
law the current trend of the ECJ has since the FII (II) case been to extend 
the free movement of capital to apply on more and more circumstances. 
Moreover, in view of the latest case law the free movement of capital 
can hardly be described as curbed and now the ECJ often observes that 
the freedom of establishment is merely an avoidable consequence of the 
free movement of capital and not vice verse. Furthermore, as stated 
above in this chapter the room for simultaneously applying the free 
movement of capital and the freedom of establishment decreased since 
the free movement of capital, in cases involving third parties, applies 
when national legislation is generic. 
3.5.2 The definite influence-rule 
The term definite influence has been used consequently in the ECJ case 
law since the Baars case and is today without exception used in all cases 
where it is relevant.125 
 
Furthermore, when Hemels observes that the definite influence-rule is 
not applied in a judgment or an opinion it is clear that she means her 
definition of the definite influence-rule and that the Court and the AG 
seemed to value other criterions when determining which freedom to 
apply. I do agree with Hemels that the ECJ in Glaxo Wellcome and the 
AG in the HSBC case were unclear on what circumstances will 
determine what fundamental freedom will be relevant. Moreover, this 
might be a symptom of a generally unclear case law of that time where it 
is hard to find a clear line in some judgments. Furthermore, these cases, 
as did most the cases when the ECJ deviated from the dominance rule, 
did not involve third parties. Consequently, it seems that the ECJ has 
been more eager to deviate from its own rules when the choice of 
freedom will not have any importance on the outcome of the case.  It is 
somewhat surprising that Hemels does not point out this fact.  
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I agree with Cordewener that the wordings in the provisions on when the 
free movement of capital apply ostensibly appears to have the same 
scope as the term definite influence. However, since the ECJ has made, 
although not always clear, distinctions between these wordings I do not 
see it as problematic that the wordings sounds similar as long as they are 
differentiated in practice.  Furthermore, it would be hard to draw a 
different line between the two freedoms if capital movements would also 
include holdings with substantial influence since then the freedom of 
establishment would seldom apply.  However, of course this would not 
be a problem if the ECJ stopped to apply the dominance rule. Smit’s 
criticism regarding the definite influence-rule is mainly from an 
economic and not legal perspective and this should be the responsibility 
of the lawmakers. However, his criticism has also similarities with the 
criticism of the dominance rule and the facts of the case-rule (see below 
4.2.2). 
 
I do not see the definite influence-rule as problematic since it is natural 
that if a person establishes herself in another MS then also that person 
must have a large amount of influence in the establishment. However, it 
is more problematic what kind of legislation or circumstances do confer 
definite influence and that will be discussed below (see below 4 and 6.2). 
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4 How to establish definite 
influence  
4.1 General remarks 
In chapter three I examined that the dominance rule (see above 3.3) 
provides that two or more freedoms cannot be applied simultaneously. 
Furthermore, in that chapter I also examined that the definite influence-
rule decides if the freedom of establishment will be the relevant freedom. 
However, in that chapter I did not examine if the ECJ assesses the 
factual circumstances of a case (the facts of the case-rule, see below 4.2) 
or the spirit and the aim of the concerned legislation (the purpose of the 
legislation-rule, see below 4.3) when determining if definite influence 
exists. Consequently, this will be examined below. Finally, in the end of 
this chapter I will draw my own conclusions of these rules and their 
applicability. 
 
In the ECJ case- law in this field the purpose of the legislation-rule has 
always been applied to determine if the concerned national legislation is 
a specific measure, ie. if the regulations only apply at portfolio 
investments or circumstances only conferring definite influence. 
Moreover, if the legislation is judged as not constituting a specific 
measure then the purpose of the legislation-rule or the facts of the case-
rule will determine which freedom is relevant.126  
 
Nijkeuter observes that the ECJ has not commented on the reason behind 
the different rules discussed in this chapter and when they apply when 
legislation has been generic. Furthermore, Nijkeuter observes that this 
has lead to unclear ECJ case law regarding to in which extent EU-law 
may be applied on third parties.127 
4.2 The facts of the case-rule 
4.2.1 Background and case law 
The facts of the case-rule is when the ECJ examines if the factual 
circumstances in a case, when the concerned legislation constitutes a 
generic measure, confer definite influence. This rule has often been 
applied if the aim and spirit of the legislation does not provide which of 
the two freedoms will predominant. According to the current case- law 
(see below chapter 5), in contrast to older case- law, the facts of the case-
rule will never apply in cases involving third parties as this rule will 
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often lead to that third parties may not take part of the internal market. 128 
Below, I will examine scholarly opinions of this rule and cases where the 
facts of the case-rule has been prevalent.129  
 
Schaper observes that the ECJ has never applied the facts of the case-
rule in order to bar third parties from invoking the free movement of 
capital in circumstances where the national legislation not only confers 
definite influence. Moreover, this conversely means that the purpose of 
the legislation-rule has always been the relevant rule concerning third 
parties and that this is confirmed by the FII (II) judgment (see below 
5.2).130 However some authors disagree and observe that the issue has 
been characterized by inconsistency.131  
 
The ACT and FII (I) judgments from the end of 2006 stemmed from a 
group of litigations and as such contained a number of different factual 
circumstances. Moreover, the cases concerned tax on dividends that 
applied irrespective of the size of a holding.  Furthermore, in some of the 
factual circumstances referred in the cases the subsidiaries were fully 
owned, in some circumstances they were not and in some circumstances 
there was little factual information.  
 
In the ACT case the ECJ first observed that in cases with factual definite 
influence the freedom of establishment would apply. Moreover, in other 
cases where there was less factual information the Court used the 
purpose of the legislation-rule.132 In these ACT case, as well as in the FII 
(I) case the ECJ first observed that in some cases with factual definite 
influence the freedom of establishment would apply and in cases with 
less information about the factual circumstances the purpose of the 
legislation-rule would apply. However, later when the ECJ examined 
other questions from the referring court the ECJ commented that both 
the facts of the case-rule and the purpose of the legislation-rule should be 
applied without explaining why.  Nonetheless, when answering another 
question from the referring court the ECJ made several comments that 
implied that the ECJ applied the purpose of the legislation-rule when 
deciding that the freedom of establishment would be the relevant 
freedom. Finally the Court also observed that since the concerned 
legislation concerned a group of companies it fell under the scope of the 
freedom of establishment and in a later paragraph the ECJ commented133 
 
As regards the Treaty provisions relating to the freedoms 
of movement, since the legislation at issue applies to 
payments of dividends to resident companies irrespective 
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of the size of their holding, it is capable of coming within 
the scope of both Article 43 EC on freedom of 
establishment and Article 56 EC on the free movement of 
capital. 134 
 
The ECJ in the FII (I) judgment also observed that the grandfather clause 
did not apply since the concerned provisions only regarded capital 
movements involving direct investments and that the purpose of the 
holdings were not establishments, control and lasting economic links.135 
 
Some authors argue, partly because the two cases were group litigation 
cases that covered many different circumstances, that the ACT and FII 
(I) judgments are vague. 136 Hemels further observes that these cases 
may be interpreted as that the freedom of establishment does not have an 
absolute predominance over the free movement of capital that some 
thought it had at that time. Moreover, this is mainly because of the ECJ 
in most of the cases analyzed both freedoms without regard of 
controlling interest. Furthermore, Hemels argues that the ACT and FII (I) 
cases prove that the deciding point of which freedom to apply lies on the 
relevant legislation and not the facts of the case. Hemels further observes 
that the difference between the facts of the case-rule and the purpose of 
the legislation-rule sometimes can become blurred and that this is 
highlighted in these cases.137 
 
The Burda case from June 2008 concerned dividends distributed within 
the EU and involved a directive138 that required 25 percent holding to 
apply.  Moreover, in this case the ECJ observed that if national tax 
legislation solely applies to groups of companies, those provisions 
primarily falls under the scope of the freedom of establishment. 
Moreover, the ECJ also observed that generic legislation may fall into 
the ambit of both freedoms. Nonetheless, the Court observed that the non 
resident company owned 50 percent of the shares in the resident German 
subsidiary and that such an ownership created definite and decisive 
influence139 over the resident company and therefore the circumstances 
fell under the scope of the freedom of establishment.  The ECJ then 
continued and observed that restrictive effects on the free movement of 
capital were just an unavoidable consequence and as such there was no 
need to assess the free movement of capital.140 
 
The KBC bank case from June 2009 was a court order and concerned 
dividends distributed from a Swiss company and generic legislation. 
Moreover, the ECJ observed that the purpose of the legislation-rule was 
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important but found that the freedom of establishment applied because 
the shareholder’s holdings conferred definite influence. Hemels observes 
that this is surprising since the facts of the case-rule (see below 4.2.1) ) 
can only lead to one result and what is then the purpose of also 
considering the purpose of the legislation-rule?141  
 
The Aberdeen property case was also ruled in the summer of 2009 and 
concerned dividends distributed within the EU. Moreover in this case the 
national tax legislation only applied on holdings that exceeded 20 
percent and the subsidiary was wholly owned by the parent company. 142 
The ECJ observed that like in previous cases 143 the circumstances in the 
judgment solely related to a subsidiary that distributed dividends to non-
resident companies who had definite influence in the subsidiary. 
Moreover, if then the relevant national tax provisions is an obstacle to 
the free movement of capital those effects would be an unavoidable 
consequence of restrictions to the freedom of establishment. 144 This 
judgment has striking similarities with the Burda case and I interpret this 
judgment as that the Court applied the facts of the case-rule in the 
Aberdeen case, a conclusion that Hemels agrees on.145   
 
The SGI case from the beginning of 2010 concerned generic thin cap 
legislation that also applied on cases not conferring definite influence 
and in the case the shareholder owned 64 percent of the subsidiary and 
was also a board member in it. Moreover, in this case the AG in her 
opinion first commented that definite influence only exists in group 
relations and factors such as interdependence, size of holdings, 
relationships and the group’s technologies should be considered if 
definite influence existed, as it did in this case. However, The AG did 
not observe that a freedom was dominant and questioned if the cases 
Burda and Aberdeen property should be interpreted as that the freedom 
of establishment was dominant over the free movement of capital when 
the facts of the case fell under the freedom of establishment and referred 
to the Glaxo Wellcome case (see above 3.4.4).146 Hemels comments that 
the AG apparently doubted the facts of the case-rule without providing 
an alternative.147  The ECJ in the SGI case first observed the important 
role of the purpose of the legislation-rule and concluded that the 
legislation did not confer definite influence. However, the ECJ later 
commented that it existed factual definite influence because of the 
shareholdings in the case and ties on management level between the 
concerned companies and ruled that the freedom of establishment was 
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the applicable freedom.148 Finally, Cordewener observes that the reason 
of the formulations by the AG in the SGI case might, like the opinion in 
the Glaxo Wellcome case was dissatisfaction with the unclear and 
inconsistent ECJ case law prevalent at that time.149  
4.2.2 Criticism of the facts of the case-rule 
Boer observes that he views the facts of the case-rule as more 
problematic than the purpose of the legislation-rule and subsequently 
comments that the first mentioned rule might lead to undesirable and 
erratic results. He gives the following example of such unsatisfactory 
outcomes: 150  
For example, distributions of dividends by Company A, 
resident in [MS] X, are exempt from withholding tax if 
these payments, irrespective of the size of the shareholding 
in Company A, are made to a company which is also 
resident in [MS] X, whereas distributions made by 
Company A to a company resident in another [MS] are 
subject to withholding tax in [MS] X, irrespective of the 
size of the shareholding of the recipient. If a resident of a 
third country holds 100% of the shares (that is, has definite 
influence) in Company A, it may not invoke the free 
movement of capital, as it has definite influence over 
Company A. However, if this third country resident held a 
small (for example, 10%) equity interest (that is, no 
definite influence) in Company A, it would be able to rely 
on the free movement of capital.151 
Many scholars put forward similar criticism and, in summary, observe 
that the facts of the case-rule provides that a person with no active 
management and control in its holdings in a third country has more 
protection than a managerial holder. Moreover, they comment that it is 
hard to grasp why an investor will obtain less protection the more she 
invests.152  
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4.3 The purpose of the legislation-rule 
4.3.1 Background and case law 
In contrast to the facts of the case-rule the purpose of the legislation-rule 
examines the aim and spirit of the concerned national legislation and not 
the factual circumstances in a case. It is uncommon that the ECJ 
examines both freedoms when they apply the purpose of the legislation-
rule before it determines which freedom to apply.153 Furthermore, below 
I will examine ECJ case law where the purpose of the legislation-rule 
has had an important role and scholarly opinions of this rule. 154 
 
The Thin Cap case from March 2007 concerned a part of the British thin 
cap legislation that only applied to interest payments to non-UK lenders. 
In this case a non- British parent company had loaned money to its UK 
subsidiary which it owned 75 percent of the shares in. The ECJ found 
that the main object of the UK thin cap legislation was to apply on 
groups of companies and covered situations where the lender company 
was subject of a certain degree of control by the borrower. Thus, the UK 
tax provisions relied on the freedom of establishment and not the free 
movement of capital since it required the parent company to have 
definite influence on the subsidiary’s decisions and be able to determine 
the subsidiary’s actions.155 
 
A few months later in May 2007 the ECJ rendered its decision in the 
Lasertec case that concerned the question if the German thin cap 
legislation was restricting to any or several of the fundamental freedoms. 
In this case the concerned company owned two thirds of the shares in the 
subsidiary and the relevant German legislation applied when there was a 
holding of more than 25 percent, a substantial holding156 in the words of 
the ECJ.157 In this judgment the Court referred to older case law158 and 
then stated that when judging which freedom a legislation falls under the 
purpose of the legislation must be regarded.159 Furthermore, the ECJ 
ruled that the tax legislation relied upon the freedom of establishment 
since it related to shareholdings exerting the shareholder definite 
influence. However, the ECJ also noted that factual definite influence 
after all existed in the case.160 
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In the Lasertec case the ECJ referred to the ACT and FII (I) cases in its 
judgment and Hemels observes that it is surprising that the Court refers 
to the FII and ACT cases since it is unclear if the Court took the purpose 
of the legislation into account in those judgments.161 However, the 
Lasertec case was the first time the ECJ ruled on a decision on the 
relationship and priority between the freedom of establishment and the 
free movement of capital in a situation which involved third parties and 
the cases which the ECJ refers to in the judgment did not involve third 
parties.162 Moreover, Hemels points out that since the ECJ also observed 
that the shareholder had definite influence163 it thus showed some regard 
to the facts of the case-rule.164  Cordewener observes that the threshold 
in Lasertec for a legislation to exert definite influence is a holding of 25 
percent. He further comments that an even smaller holding would suffice 
to confer definite influence if other related shareholdings are also taken 
into account.165  
 
The Holböck decision was rendered in May 2007 and concerned generic 
legislation and dividends distributed from a third party to its MS holder. 
In this case the Court observed that the concerned national legislation 
fell under both the free movement of capital and the freedom of 
establishment.  Furthermore, the ECJ commented that the freedom of 
establishment could not be invoked because the case involved third 
parties. However the Court observed that national legislation did 
constitute a restriction under the free movement of capital. 166 Moreover, 
in this case it is certain that the Court did not apply the facts of the case-
rule since Holböck owned two thirds of the shares in the concerned 
company. The Holböck case it is the only case in the ECJ case law from 
2007 and onwards that involved third parties and where the two 
freedoms were both examined.167 
 
Nonetheless, The ECJ observed in Holböck that the grandfather clause 
was applicable since the holding of two thirds of the shares in the 
company allowed the holder to participate effectively in the management 
of that company or in its control168 and that the concerned national 
legislation that provided a less favorable tax treatment169for holdings 
which enabled the holder control and establishment.170 However, Terra 
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argues that the true meaning of the ECJ was that even if the free 
movement of capital would have applied the claimant would still not 
succeed because the relevant Austrian legislation was grandfathered. 171  
 
The OY AA case from the summer of 2007 was ruled in the Grand 
Chamber and concerned national regulations that concerned a group of 
companies and factual definite influence. Moreover, in this case the ECJ 
did a similar assessment as in the Lasertec case but in an opposite order, 
it first examined if definite influence existed in regard to the factual 
circumstances in the case and later analyzed the national regulations 
according to the purpose of the legislation-rule and observed that since 
the national tax regulations only covered groups of companies they 
conferred definite influence.172  
 
The Idryma Typou case concerned unclear factual circumstances and a 
Greek legislation on maximum shareholdings in media companies by 
journalists that in some cases applied on holdings of more than 25 
percent and in some cases of holdings of more than 2, 5 percent. In this 
case the ECJ observed that the purpose of the legislation shall determine 
which freedom to apply and generic measures like the concerned 
regulations may fall under the scope of both the free movement of 
capital and the freedom of establishment. In this case the Court observed 
that a legislation requiring  25 percent ownership may constitute definite 
influence depending on the circumstances and in particular on how the 
75 percent of the other shares are owned and as such the Greek 
legislation would be viewed in light of the freedom of establishment.   
Conversely, the ECJ commented that holdings of 2, 5 percent may fall 
under the free movement of capital. Moreover, the ECJ commented that 
even if a journalist can have the purpose of influencing a company a 
mere 2, 5 percent does not suffice to establish definite influence and 
even if the legislation is directed towards journalists the shareholders 
may not be journalists. Consequently the Greek legislation should also 
be viewed in the light of the free movement of capital. 173 
 
The joint Haribo and Salinen cases concerned taxations of dividends and 
the ECJ first observed that the ECJ will only extract information that the 
national court, the tribunal and main proceedings provide the ECJ with 
to apply in its judgment. The ECJ continued and commented that the 
purpose of the legislation is decisive when determining which freedom is 
relevant in a particular case. Moreover, in this case the ECJ found that 
the national regulations should be viewed only in the light of the free 
movement of capital since the national tax law only applied on holdings 
of less than 10 percent.174 
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However, in this judgment the ECJ also observed that the concerned 
provisions did not fall into the ambit of the grandfather clause. This was 
because the clause did not apply on national regulations regarding capital 
movements that involved direct investments. Furthermore, the concerned 
holdings were not acquired with the purpose of establishment with 
lasting economic links and the holding did not provide the shareholder 
with management and control. Furthermore, the ECJ observed that the 
concerned legislation only applied on holdings of less than 10 percent 
and as such it was not possible that the factual circumstances constituted 
direct investments.175 
 
The Scheunemann case from the summer of 2012 involved third parties 
and the national legislation concerned inheritance tax and company 
holdings. Moreover, the ECJ in this case observed that the purpose of the 
legislation should determine which freedom to apply and that the 
concerned national legislation applied on ownerships exceeding 25 
percent. Furthermore, a requirement of that extent conferred definite 
influence according to the Court but at the end of the judgment it also 
observed that after all there was a 100 percent factual ownership that 
also conferred definite influence.176 
4.3.2 Criticism of the purpose of legislation-
rule  
Boer finds the purpose of the legislation as a more rational rule 
compared to the facts of the case-rule but observes that neither the 
purpose of the legislation-rule is free from problems and gives an 
example:177 
where legislation is aimed purely at corporate groups, such as 
CFC legislation, or rules governing the transfer of losses or 
profits within a group, such legislation may not be permitted in 
intra-EU situations, but would nevertheless be permitted in 
situations involving third countries, despite its (indirect) 
discriminatory effect. Although such legislation would, in 
principle, fall within the scope of the free movement of capital, 
due to the ‘definite influence’ concept, the free movement of 
capital is regarded as an unavoidable consequence of any 
restriction on the freedom of establishment and an examination 
on the basis of the free movement of capital is not allowed.178 
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4.4 Conclusions 
4.4.1 General conclusions 
Since the ECJ started to use the definite influence-rule it also started to 
apply the purpose of the legislation-rule and the facts of the case-rule.  
Sometimes the ECJ has only applied the purpose of the legislation-rule 
and sometimes it has applied both. Prior to 2010 the facts of the case-
rule was more frequently applied in cases concerning generic legislation, 
but sometimes the purpose of the legislation-rule was applied, by way of 
example in the Glaxo Wellcome and Holböck cases. Moreover, it is in 
this area that the ECJ case law has been greatly inconsistent prior to the 
FII (II) judgment (see below 5.1) as there seems to have been no rule as 
to whether to use the facts of the case-rule of the purpose of the 
legislation-rule concerning generic measures. Moreover, in some cases 
such as the FII (I) case it has sometimes been hard to distinguish which 
rule has been applied and as Hemels observes the difference is 
sometimes blurred. Furthermore, since the facts of the case-rule still 
applies when third parties are not involved these inconsistencies may 
continue in those cases (see above 3.4.3, below 4.4.3.2). 
4.4.2 The practical difference between the 
two rules 
In a number of ECJ judgments referred to in this thesis there has been no 
practical difference between the facts of the case-rule and the purpose of 
the legislation-rule.  In several cases that were ruled according to the 
purpose of the legislation- rule the facts of the case-rule would have lead 
to the same freedom being applied. By way of example the Thin cap, OY 
AA and Lasertec cases and as such it has not been problematic for the 
ECJ to mention both rules under these circumstances. In these cases both 
the concerned national legislation and the factual circumstances exerted 
definite influence. Conversely, naturally if both rules do not confer 
definite influence the free movement of capital will apply. 
 
However, if the purpose of the legislation does not exert definite 
influence but the factual circumstances confer such influence there will 
be different outcomes depending on which rule will be applied. In the 
Holböck, Glaxo Wellcome, FII (II) (see below 5.2) cases among others it 
existed a factual definite influence but still the free movement of capital 
applied.  In contrast in other cases concerning generic legislation the 
facts of the case-rule was applied and consequently the freedom of 
establishment was found to be the relevant freedom, such as in the 
Burda, KBC, Aberdeen and SGI cases.  However, in the Aberdeen case 
the legislation required a holding of 20 percent to apply and there was 
factual definite influence. In this case it is hard to determine the impact 
of the legislation but considering the current case law it is not impossible 
that a legislation conferring 20 percent would exert definite influence 
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(see below 6.2). Moreover, similar considerations most be drawn in 
relationship to the Burda case where the involved directive required a 25 
percent holding. Moreover, if the purpose of the legislation requires a 
holding of more than 20 percent it is, naturally, likely that the factual 
circumstances will exert definite influence since then the parties covered 
by the legislation would have substantial holdings in each other. 
 
Finally, thus the only circumstances where the outcome might be 
different depending on the choice of rule are when the aim and spirit of 
the legislation does no confer definite influence but when the factual 
circumstances confer such an influence.  
4.4.3 The facts of the case-rule 
4.4.3.1 General considerations 
The facts of the case-rule is rarely applied on its own and as such seems 
to be applied when the purpose of the legislation cannot alone provide 
which freedom to apply. Moreover, After the FII (II) case (see below 
5.2), in contrast to earlier case- law (see below 4.4.3.2), the facts of the 
case-rule cannot be applied if it would lead to results to would hinder 
third persons to invoke the free movement of capital, which means that 
in the future it will never be applied in cases involving third parties. 
Furthermore, in my view this will lead to more foreseeable outcomes and 
lead to the result that the facts of the case-rule will be applied in less 
extent than it was before.179 
Hemels and many others with her criticize the facts of the case-rule by 
observing that persons with portfolio investments in third state relations 
have more protection than those persons with substantive holdings in 
third state relations. Boer puts forward similar criticism and observes 
that the facts of the case-rule is unforeseeable and might lead to 
undesirable results. One might agree that two third parties that in a 
different extent invest in a MS may obtain different treatment according 
to the same generic law which might lead to a situation where the 
concerned national legislation will create legal uncertainties and be 
unsafe. However, in line with the FII (II) judgment this situation will not 
apply according to the current case-law of the ECJ. 
Nonetheless, the grandfather clause will still be interpreted in view of the 
facts of the case-rule (see above 2.3.2 and below 6.3) and might provide 
similar problems as described above. Moreover, I think that these 
problems are a natural outcome of the vagueness of the TFEU 
regulations of the scope of the free movement of capital and the ECJ’s 
attempts to curb it under some circumstances. However, one might think 
that this is a general problem with generic legislation and that certainties 
will be created by the case law, which it however did not do above (see 
above 4.2). 
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However, according to me there are also benefits with the Facts of the 
case-rule, even in circumstances involving third parties. It allows the 
Court to consider more circumstances than a legislation which often only 
requires a certain extent of a holding for a certain legislations to apply. 
4.4.3.2 The scope of the facts of the case-rule 
As discussed above the facts of the case-rule will never be applied when 
third parties are involved since it would further restrict their access to the 
inner market. However, Schaper argues that the ECJ has never applied 
the facts of the case-rule to preclude third parties from invoking EU law 
and consequently that the FII (II) judgment did, in fact, not change the 
case law in this field, a view not shared by many other scholars. In the 
KBC case there were third parties involved and the Court applied the 
facts of the case-rule and found the freedom of establishment to be the 
relevant freedom. Furthermore, in the Scheunemann and Lasertec cases 
the Court applied the purpose of the legislation-rule to rule that the 
freedom of establishment would apply but in the end observed that it 
after all existed factual definite influence in the those cases. 
In the past the facts of the case-rule has had a major role in most cases 
not involving third parties that concerned generic measures, but not in all 
cases, such as Glaxo Wellcome. According to the FII (II) and Beker 
judgments (see below 5.2, 5.3) the facts of the case –rule will still and 
only apply under circumstances when dividends originate in an MS. 
Moreover, this is according to the ECJ because in those latter situations 
it would be impossible to establish the purpose of the legislation.  
However, I think that this comment is confusing since it is hard to 
understand why it would be harder to determine the purpose of the 
legislation under intra-EU circumstances compared to other similar 
legislation. What is the difference between these kinds of legislation 
when third parties are not involved? Does the EU assume that a purpose 
of the legislation can never be, if it does not confer definite influence, 
that third parties should not be able to take part in the inner market? 
Moreover, even if the FII (II) judgment limits these principles, 
concerning intra-EU situations, to dividends it has since been extended 
to other forms of direct taxation such as group relief in the recent 
Felixstowe judgment. However, the also recent DMC case (see below 
5.3) involved MS parties with factual definite influence and concerned 
generic legislation regarding exit taxes. In this case the ECJ observed 
that generic legislation might fall under both freedoms (which would not 
be the case if third parties were involved) but did not apply the facts of 
the case-rule on the generic legislation.  Furthermore, this provides that 
the ECJ case law is still unclear in this field.  
 
It seems to be settled case- law, in line with the FII (II) and Beker cases, 
that the facts of the case-rule will still apply on generic legislation when 
dividends are distributed inside the inner market. This also seems to the 
case concerning group relief when third parties are not involved but 
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maybe not concerning exit taxes. It is surprising the ECJ applies the facts 
of the case principles regarding some types of direct taxation but not all 
types.  This is especially the case since the ECJ seems to extend the 
purpose of the legislation-rule to apply on all kinds of direct taxes when 
third parties are involved (see above 6.2.1). Why not apply the facts of 
the case-rule on all kinds of generic measures when third parties are not 
involved if the Court already continued to apply the facts of the case-rule 
concerning dividends? 
 
However, I am of the opinion that the ECJ-case law would be more 
easily understood and logical if the facts of the case-rule would also lose 
its importance in situations not involving third parties and as such the 
scope of the free movement of capital would also be extended in these 
circumstances. Moreover, this is because in intra-EU settings it is purely 
of academical importance which freedom will apply in these cases and 
as such I see it as unnecessary complicated to apply different rules in 
cases only involving MS parties.  
 
I nonetheless partly agree with the explanation put forward by Nijkeuter 
(see above 5.2.2) that the only reason why the ECJ limited the use of the 
facts of the case-rule to intra-EU circumstances in FII (II) was because 
the purpose of the judgment was to open the inner market for more third 
parties, not to provide changes for MS parties. However, I also think one 
reason was that the Court did not want to make it appear as if the free 
movement of capital extended its reach too far by still allowing many 
MS parties to litigate under it. Perhaps some judges were dissenting and 
did not approve of the FII (II) principles and found a small victory in 
only providing the changes for third parties.  
4.4.4 The purpose of the legislation-rule 
The purpose of the case-rule is applied, either alone or together with the 
facts of the case-rule in all ECJ judgments that are relevant to this thesis. 
Furthermore, according to the current case law the purpose of the 
legislation-rule will always be applied if third parties are involved 
(except for when examining if a certain legislation will be grandfathered, 
see above 2.3.2, below 6.3).  
The purpose of the legislation-rule is the preferred rule by most scholars 
but it is not free from criticism. Boer criticizes the wording that one 
freedom is an unavoidable consequence of another freedom that often 
occurs in ECJ judgments that rely on the purpose of legislation-rule. 
Moreover, this will under some circumstances lead to that legislation 
that aims to prevent undesirable actions, for example tax planning, only 
aims at cases which confer definite influence and as such MS parties in 
third state relation may not be subject of this kind of legislation. 
Furthermore, this is since the free movement of capital would just be an 
avoidable consequence of the freedom of establishment under those 
circumstances. It is my view that it is the responsibility of the MS to not 
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render more beneficial rules for third parties than for parties solely doing 
business within the internal market. However, this criticism seems to be 
more directed at the dominance rule (see above 3.3) than at the purpose 
of the legislation-rule since the facts of the case-rule, naturally, also may 
lead to similar results which shows that this is a general problem for 
legislation in this field.  
It is my firm opinion that the purpose of the legislation-rule will as stated 
above create a more foreseeable case law since it is possible to examine 
what kind of legislation will confer definite influence and not take 
account of specific factual circumstances. Moreover, the ECJ examines 
if certain legislation is restricting any of the fundamental freedoms, not if 
a person is restricting it and thus it is more logical to only examine the 
legislation and not the factual circumstances.  
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5 Advancement of the free 
movement of capital 
5.1 General remarks  
In the previous chapter I analyzed how the ECJ determines if definite 
influence exists. However, in line with the FII (II) judgment there has 
been a trend by the Court, according to the rules explained in the third 
and fourth chapters, to extend the free movement of capital when third 
persons are involved. Moreover, this trend will be examined below and I 
will start by analyzing the landmark FII (II) case and scholarly opinions 
of this judgment. Furthermore, when I examine this case I will also put 
great focus on the safety clause in the judgment since that clause might 
restrict the free movement of capital when third persons are involved and 
as such requires additional scrutiny. Moreover, later in this chapter I will 
examine the cases that followed the FII (II) judgment and at the end of 
the chapter I will draw my own conclusions of the findings in this 
chapter. 
5.2 The FII (II) case 
5.2.1 Overview of the FII (II) case 
The FII (II) case from November 2012 concerned generic legislation, 
factual definite influence and was ruled in Grand Chamber which 
implicates its great principal importance. In this judgment the ECJ 
started by observing that tax legislation concerning dividends may fall 
under one of the two freedoms and it is the purpose of the legislation that 
is pivotal when determining which freedom will apply. However, the 
ECJ referred to the Burda, FII (I) and SGI judgments and observed that 
in cases where the dividends originate from MS the facts of the case-rule 
has to be applied because it is not possible to deduce the purpose of the 
legislation in those circumstances.180 
 
The ECJ also commented that since the freedom of establishment does 
not cover third parties tax treatment of dividends that originates in third 
states, legislation concerning such circumstances may not be examined 
in view of the freedom of establishment. Furthermore, the ECJ continued 
and observed that national tax legislation concerning dividends 
distributed from third countries that did not apply exclusively181 to 
situations that conferred definite influence must be examined according 
to the free movement of capital.  
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Nonetheless, in the following paragraph the ECJ commented that if, 
when third parties are involved, consideration would be taken to both the 
aim and spirit of the legislation and factual circumstances this would be 
incompatible with the free movement of capital. The Court finally 
concluded that it was apparent that the free movement of capital 
included in principle, capital movements involving establishment or 
direct investment 182 and the Court elaborated an undertaking through 
the holding of shares which confers the possibility of effectively 
participating in its management and control183.184 
5.2.2 Scholarly opinions on the FII (II) case 
Some authors describe this case as a landmark case and Nijkeuter 
observes that it provides new principles to the EU tax law and comments 
that the ECJ in this judgment attempted to clarify the difference between 
the purpose of the legislation-rule and the facts of the case-rule. 185   
Moreover, he  interprets the judgment as that the ECJ does not only think 
that it is impossible to establish the purpose of the legislation in strict 
intra-EU situations but also under circumstances involving third parties 
since there is no difference between these cases. However, third parties 
are not covered by the freedom of establishment and thus the ECJ ruled 
that the freedom of capital would apply regardless of the factual 
circumstances.  Moreover, Nijkeuter does not believe that the principles 
can be interpreted a contrario as if the freedom of establishment does 
not apply and as such the free movement of capital will be the relevant 
freedom.  Furthermore, Nijkeuter observes  
 
it appears that the CJEU [the ECJ] recognizes alternatives 
paths, whereby if it finds that one path (establishment) reaches a 
dead end, it will take the other path (capital).186 
 
Nijkeuter and Hilling further comments that the FII (II) judgment 
provides a case law where generic legislation concerning third parties 
will always fall under the free movement of capital. 187 
 
The AG in the Kronos case (see below 5.4) noted that the FII (II) 
judgment created a case law which did not, in contrast to pre-FII (II) 
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case law, create situations where the Union law could not be applied at 
all. Moreover, these circumstances would occur if legislation is found to 
fall under the scope of the freedom of establishment but the concerned 
party was a third party and thus EU law was not applicable. Furthermore, 
the Kronos AG concluded that the FII (II) case was explicit only 
regarding specifically third party situations.188  O’Shea thinks that the 
FII (II) case does not drastically change the ECJ case law in this field. 
Moreover, this is mainly because the threshold for a legislation to be 
considered to confer definite influence is low, by way of example 25 
percent in the Scheunemann case (see above 4.3.1).189 
Ohlsson observes that with this new case law, the purpose of the 
legislation will determine which freedom to apply. Ohlsson further 
comments that the FII (II) judgment was very general in its wordings 
and should be applicable on other circumstances than when third parties 
distribute dividends to MS parties. Ohlsson then takes the Itelcar case 
(see below 5.3) as an example where the principles of the FII (II) has 
been applied on other areas than distribution of dividends from third 
parties. Moreover, Hilling observes that the FII (II) case to some extent 
is in line with the Holböck judgment.190 
Tax notes international columnist Sheppard observes that normally 
persons having portfolio investments litigate under the free movement of 
capital and controlled companies instead use the freedom of 
establishment. However, she further comments that the FII (II) case has 
provided a relentless march of […] the free movement of capital191 and 
that the ECJ despite a factual full ownership in the case hoofed the ball 
into the opposing half192.  Moreover, this was to provide a remedy for 
the taxpayers and therefore stretched the free movement of capital to be 
the applicable freedom in the case.193  
 
Sheppard also observes in another column regarding the recent ECJ case 
law concerning capital movements that the ECJ has given more rights to 
investors and at the same time restricted MS to retain subsidies for MS 
parties. Moreover, the consequence of this is that many EU citizens view 
the Union as illegitimate which makes them vote for populist parties.194  
5.2.3 The safety clause in the FII (II) judgment 
The ECJ makes a highly interesting comment at the end of the FII (II) 
judgment where it observes: 
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Since the Treaty does not extend freedom of establishment to 
third countries, it is important to ensure that the interpretation of 
Article 63(1) TFEU as regards relations with third countries 
does not enable economic operators who do not fall within the 
limits of the territorial scope of freedom of establishment to 
profit from that freedom Such a risk does not exist in a situation 
such as that at issue in the main proceedings. The legislation of 
the [MS] in question does not relate to the conditions for access 
of a company from that [MS] to the market in a third country 
or of a company from a third country to the market in that 
[MS] It concerns only the tax treatment of dividends which derive 
from investments which their recipient has made in a company 
established in a third country (emphasis added).195 
 
Nijkeuter observes that the safety clause in the FII (II) judgment is 
formulated like an anti-abuse clause and is a novelty in the case law in 
this field and that it is hard to interpret. Furthermore, Nijkeuter observes 
that the probable intention of the ECJ is that those economic operators 
are entities with a European nationality196 and observes that those are 
 
for tax purposes, resident outside the territories of the EU/EEA, or that 
are resident in the EU/EEA, but whose indirect or direct acts of 
establishment occur outside the EU/EEA. These entities fall under the 
personal scope of the freedom of establishment because of their 
‘European passport’, but do not fall under the territorial scope of this 
freedom, as they are in fact investing outside the EU/EEA territory it 
involves outbound investments in other words.197 
 
Moreover, Nijkeuter comments that this could also be interpreted from 
the wording that economic operators are a company of that [MS] in a 
third country and that is why the intention of the ECJ is not that the 
safety clause should comprise inbound investments and third persons 
establishing themselves within the EU since their third status exempts 
them from the personal (not territorial) scope of the freedom of 
establishment.198 Furthermore, Nijkeuter comments that this runs 
contrary to  the ECJ wording a company from a third country in that 
[MS] and he further observes that he does not comprehend this because 
this situation does not fall inside the territorial scope of the freedom of 
establishment, but outside its personal scope?199 Moreover, Nijkeuter 
observes that the only reason for this is if the territorial position of both 
the investors governs the territorial scope of the freedom of 
establishment but that would make the FII (II) judgment 
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incomprehensible since the judgment itself extends the reach of the 
freedom of capital to third parties with external cross-border acts of 
establishment200 that cannot invoke the freedom of establishment. If the 
ECJ wanted to restrict them why not observe that their actions fall under 
the freedom of establishment instead of restricting them by cryptically 
exclude them by way of a newly developed limitation201. 
 
Regarding the market access formulation in the safety clause Nijkeuter 
observes that the intention of the ECJ seems to be that the safety clause 
has certain restrictions and does not apply in the FII (II) case since there 
was no risk of market access because the concerned legislation did not 
relate to the conditions for access to the market but instead only involves 
a tax measure. This according to Nijkeuter would be because the case 
related to UK taxation and not that the concerned company by way of 
example did not apply for a license or similar to establish itself as in the 
Fidium Finanz case. Moreover, Nijkeuter interprets this as if the ECJ 
differentiates measures that apply on taxes that apply after market entry 
and taxes that apply when entering a market and if that is the case the 
safety clause does not apply at all on direct taxation and that the 
distinction is somewhat tenuous202 since it is only a gradual 
distinguishing. Nijkeuter concludes and observes that  
 
 [The ECJ does express concern about abuse situations, although 
it does not seem to see any problems arising as regards 
taxation.203 
 
Sheppard observes regarding the safety clause that seemingly some 
judges were worried of the consequences of the FII (II) case and hence 
added this clause in the FII (II) judgment. This is according to Sheppard 
to hinder third persons to use the free movement of capital to access the 
internal market when the freedom of establishment was inapplicable. 
Moreover, Sheppard observes that some tax scholars204, namely Philip 
Baker QC of Gray’s Inn Tax Chambers , are worried of the practical 
consequences of the clause since it is not clear what legislation qualifies 
for the safety clause and that MS will use the clause to restrict the free 
movement of capital.205 
 
The AG in the currently pending Kronos case observed that the safety 
clause in the FII (II) case restricted third parties from abusing legislation 
that gave access to the internal market. The AG further observed that the 
safety clause was, in principle, the same as the safety clause in the 
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Fidium Finanz case. That case concerned a license for financial services 
in Germany and that was in fact a form accessing the market in that 
state. With that in mind, it was according to the AG, hard to imagine that 
acquiring such a license would fall under the scope of the free movement 
of capital. The AG concluded that in FII (II) case the British law did not 
have the purpose to regulate the access to the market like the German 
regulations did in the Fidium Finanz case.206 
5.3 Confirmations of the FII (II) 
principles 
The ECJ confirmed the principles outlined in the FII (II) case in several 
judgments in 2013 and 2014. The first case in this field after the FII (II) 
judgment was the Beker judgment. Moreover, this case related to 
dividends distributed from EU parties or third parties and the factual 
circumstances involved minority holdings and third relations. The Court 
first observed that when third parties were involved the freedom of 
establishment would only be applied if the concerned legislation solely 
conferred definite influence. However, The ECJ also commented that in 
those circumstances when the dividends were distributed solely inside 
the inner market the facts of the case-rule would apply.207 
 
The Itelcar judgment concerned Portuguese thin cap regulations that 
applied on all holdings of more than 10 percent and the factual 
circumstances involved a third party owner with an indirectly wholly 
owned subsidiary in Portugal. The case contained similar wordings like 
the FII (II) judgment and the ECJ concluded that if the national tax 
legislation did not apply exclusively on circumstances that conferred 
definite interest when third parties were involved the free movement of 
capital would apply. Moreover, in this case the ECJ observed that a tax 
legislation that required at least a 10 percent holding or voting rights to 
apply will not confer a definite influence.  Finally the ECJ also inserted 
the same safety clause in the Itelcar judgment as has been found in the 
FII (II) case, with the only difference that it changed the term economic 
operators208 to lending companies established in those countries209.210 
 
Câmara observes that the national thin cap regulations in Itelcar deviated 
from other thin cap cases in the ECJ case- law211 which concerned groups 
of companies.  Moreover, this is since the regulations in Itelcar apply 
directly at an ownership of 10 percent, if a certain degree of certain thin 
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cap exists, and this situation might not always confer definite 
influence.212 
 
The DMC case from January 2014 concerned exit taxes on partnership 
assets and the factual circumstances only covered parties from within the 
EU with factual definite influence. Furthermore, the Court continued and 
commented that in line with the Holböck case that generic legislation 
might fall into the ambit of both freedoms.  Moreover, the Court also 
observed that the purpose of the concerned legislation was to protect the 
fiscal interests of the home state in relation to capital gains generated in 
the same state where taxation in other states may undermine the German 
tax base. The ECJ thus concluded that the legislation not only covered 
circumstances where investors had definite influence. As such the 
concerned regulations had more bearing on the procedure of transferring 
assets than on that of establishment as such the measures should be 
examined only in the view of the free movement of capital. 213  
 
In April 2014 the ECJ rendered its decision in the DFA case, which 
concerned third parties, generic legislation and no factual definite 
influence. 214 In this case the Court did not even mention the factual 
circumstances and observed that the free movement of capital would be 
the relevant freedom since the aim and spirit of the concerned national 
legislation was not to only cover circumstances which conferred definite 
influence. In this judgment the ECJ also observed that the concerned 
legislation did not allow economic operators who do not fall within the 
limits of the territorial scope of freedom of establishment215 to profit 
from the freedom of establishment. 216 
5.4 Currently pending cases 
The currently pending Kronos case concerns taxation of dividends that 
applies on 10 percent holdings and involves third parties with 
subsidiaries in the inner market and in EEA states. In this case the AG 
observed that when the freedom of establishment cannot be applied on a 
generic national tax law because of that a third party is involved, there is 
no risk of abuse and the concerned legislation does not only confer 
definite influence the free movement of capital will apply.  Furthermore, 
the AG commented that the principles formed in the FII (II) case also 
should apply on inner market relationships concerning generic measures 
if the parties cannot invoke the freedom of establishment. By way of 
example this could be when the parent is a third party and that it would 
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be an anomaly if the FII (II) principles could not also be applied under 
these circumstances.217 
5.5 Conclusions 
5.5.1 General conclusions  
The FII (II) judgment has been described as a landmark decision by 
many authors. I fully agree since it provides changes to the ECJ case 
law, adds structure to a field that has been characterized by inconsistency 
and furthermore provides that more third parties than before will be 
covered by EU law.  
 
The AG in the Kronos case welcomed the FII (II) judgment and he 
observed that it repaired many undesirable effects of the past case law. 
The AG pointed to the fact that prior to the FII (II) judgment  under 
certain circumstances some parties were not covered by EU-law at all, 
for example third parties. However, I think that this is somewhat 
surprising since there will always be parties that are not covered by the 
EU-law since it is called European Union not the World Union and still 
all parties will not always covered, by way of example when the 
concerned legislation only confers definite influence. Moreover, I rather 
think that the benefits of the FII (II) case lies in that it provides more 
foreseeable case law.   
 
Hilling observes that the FII (II) case is mainly in line with the Holböck 
case. I think that this is in most part correct since the ECJ in both 
judgments applied the purpose of the legislation-rule on the concerned 
generic measures. Moreover, the FII (II) case may be interpreted, as 
Nijkeuter argues, that the ECJ examined the free movement of capital 
since the freedom of establishment did not apply because third parties 
were involved. This is a similar reasoning as in the Holböck judgment 
with the difference that in the Holböck case the Court also, in brief, 
examined the freedom of establishment. Moreover, the safety clause in 
the FII (II) judgment is not found in the Holböck judgment but this 
might be because the grandfather clause applied in the Holböck case. As 
such there was no need to assure that no abuse of EU legislation was 
involved. However, Terra points out that the only reason the Holböck 
case was ruled the way it was might be because the concerned national 
legislation was grandfathered. The Holböck judgment was ruled under a 
time when the ECJ often applied the facts of the case-rule and there was 
no red line in the ECJ judgments in this field. This makes it hard to know 
the reasons behind the wording in the Holböck judgment. 
 
It is true as Sheppard observes that the FII (II) judgment provides that 
many cases that according to the past case law would fall under the 
scope of the freedom of establishment now will fall under the free 
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movement of capital. However, I think that referring to this as the 
relentless march of the free movement of capital is an overstatement and 
that the scope is still thinner than it would be if the two freedoms could 
be applied simultaneously.  
 
Sheppard further observes that the FII (II) judgment restricts 
governments from subsidizing MS parties at the expense of third parties 
and that this might lead to unwelcomed political developments. If this is 
the case I see this as the fault of the legislator and not the ECJ since it is 
the legislator that extended the reach of the free movement of capita l to 
third states and should be aware of these potential consequences.  
 
I further think that Sheppard’s criticism of FII (II) is exaggerated since 
as O’Shea observes the FII (II) judgment appears to provide a greater 
change in the case law than it actually does. Moreover, this is because 
still the threshold for legislation to confer definite influence is not high 
and as such still numerous legislations will be considered as only 
conferring definite influence. However, I do not agree with Schaper that 
the FII (II) provided no change in the ECJ case law concerning third 
parties (see above 4.4.3.2). 
 
The only significant change that the FII (II) case provides is that cases 
concerns generic legislation, involves third parties and contains factual 
definite influence will now fall under the scope of the free movement of 
capital and not the freedom of establishment. A legislation that confers 
definite influence will still fall under the scope of the freedom of 
establishment, regardless of if there are third parties or not, and nothing 
indicates that the threshold for if a legislation is conferring definite 
influence has changed. Moreover, also since the FII (II) case provides 
clear principles to this field I think that this case in general provides 
many benefits to the topic relevant to this thesis.  
5.5.2 The scope and impact of the FII (II) 
principles 
The principles of the FII (II) judgment have been applied consequently 
in later case law. It is not strange even in relation to older case law that 
the Beker or DFA cases would fall under the free movement of capital 
since they involved generic legislation and third parties with factual 
minority holdings. However, they contained, as did the Itelcar judgment, 
strikingly similar wordings as the FII (II). Moreover, in the Itelcar case 
the national legislation concerned thin cap regulations (which often has 
been identified with groups of companies) and there was a clear factual 
definite influence but still the free movement of capital applied.  
 
The AG in the Kronos opinion observed that the FII (II) principles used 
in its wording only applied to third parties that distributed dividends to 
MS parties. However, he further argued that they should be extended to 
cover all circumstances involving generic measures since third parties in 
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these circumstances could also not invoke the freedom of establishment 
since everything else would be an anomaly. Moreover, in the cases 
following the landmark FII (II) case the ECJ seems to agree with the AG 
in the Kronos case since the Court has extended the FII (II) principles to 
also cover circumstances involving third parties and dividends 
distributed from MS and interests. Moreover, the intention behind the 
FII (II) case was to allow third parties to take action against restrictions 
when legislation does not only confer definite influence. Furthermore, 
because of this it would be, as the Kronos AG argued, an anomaly to not 
extend the FII (II) principles to other types of direct taxes when third 
parties are unable to invoke the freedom of establishment and the 
concerned legislation is generic. I further think that this also has benefits 
pertaining to that it would create a more easily understood case law if the 
FII (II) principles would cover all kinds of direct taxation involving third 
parties. 
 
Ohlsson points out that the wording in the FII (II) judgment is general 
and as such should also apply on legislation covering other 
circumstances than dividends distributed from third parties. However, I 
do not agree since the ECJ specifically only observed that the new 
principles laid down in the FII (II) judgment would apply to dividends 
distributed from third parties. Nonetheless, Ohlsson, maybe since he 
published his article commenting this in 2014, was right and now the 
ECJ has extended the scope of the FII (II) principles to other 
circumstances such as interests. 
5.5.3 Conclusions regarding the safety 
clause 
The FII (II) case extended the reach of the free movement of capital. 
However at the end of the judgment the ECJ formulated a safety clause 
observed that the concerned circumstances did not fall under the scope 
of that clause. Is this a way to decrease the extension of the free 
movement of capital in another way than applying the freedom of 
establishment? According to Nijkeuter the safety clause in the FII (II) 
judgment has not been applied before in ECJ case law but the AG in the 
Kronos case argued differently. However, the clause in the Fidium 
Finanz case has a similar meaning but is formulated differently so I think 
it is a matter of taste if the clause is a novelty or not. The Itelcar and 
DFA cases contain similar clauses and should be subject to the same 
discussions as the clause in the FII (II) judgment below. Moreover, I do 
not know why the court did not insert such wording in the Beker case but 
in the cases following the Beker case that involved third parties the court 
has inserted this kind of clause.218  
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Some tax scholars (according to Sheppard) are worried of the practical 
consequences of the clause and observe that it is unclear. As will be 
shown below the clause is vague and the practical consequences are 
probably that it will never be applied, at least not concerning direct 
taxation. I do also think that that technically Nijkeuter is correct when he 
points out the logical problems in the clause. First, according to its 
wording the clause appears to take concern to parties domicile or where 
they generate income when establishing if third parties that establish 
themselves within the EU fall outside the freedom of establishment. 
However, that would, as Nijkeuter observes, interfere with the other 
parts of the FII (II) judgment. Moreover, this is because if the ECJ 
would not want these parties to invoke the free movement of capital why 
extend the free movement of capital to include them in the first place. 
The AG in the Kronos case did not discuss these issues at all, which is 
surprising since he discussed parts of the clause in a case that involved 
the two freedoms. 
 
Secondly, Nijkeuter argues that if the safety clause will be interpreted as 
that it only applies on cases similar to the Fidium Finanz case (a non-tax 
case) it will never apply on direct taxation. The AG in the Kronos case 
agreed on the similarities with the Fidium Finanz case but did not 
observe if it will ever apply on legislation concerning direct taxation. As 
Sheppard points out it is uncertain what legislation would qualify here 
but I cannot think of any legislation involving direct taxation where this 
clause could apply. 
 
It is of course unsatisfactory that the ECJ continues to formulate a clause 
that is incomprehensible. However, I think that Nijkeuter overanalyzes 
the wording of the clause. Furthermore, I agree with Sheppard that the 
reason behind the clause is more likely that it is put there because some 
judges did not agree on the majority view and expressed concern about a 
too wide scope of the free movement of capital. Moreover, as such I 
think that the ECJ added the clause to make it appear that the free 
movement of capital would not provide unrestricted access to the inner 
market. Moreover, the Court also, on purpose, may have formulated the 
clause so that it would not apply on many circumstances but did not 
think much of the exact formulation of the clause.  Furthermore, 
naturally since legislation may confer definite influence if it applies on 
25 percent holdings (see below 6.2) it is hard to think that such a low 
percentage can allow this kind of abuse. As such I choose to call this 
clause a safety clause and not an anti-abuse clause since its use seems 
more to be of esthetical purpose. Finally, since this clause has been 
inserted in all recent judgments in this field that involves third parties it 
is likely that it will be found in future similar judgments.  
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6 Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
The ECJ started to be confronted in the early 90s with how the free 
movement of capital and the freedom establishment interact and the area 
has since that time been the subject of a hectic debate among scholars. 
Moreover, the two freedoms have been applied in many of the ECJ 
judgments concerning direct taxation and also to an almost equal extent 
which points to their importance and relevance. Furthermore, starting 
from the beginning of the 21st century the ECJ developed the dominance 
and definite influence-rules. Moreover, the Court also established that 
legislation that only aims at portfolio investments will fall under the 
scope of the free movement of capital and legislation that only confers 
definite influence (often legislation that aims at group of companies such 
as transfer pricing, thin cap, group relief etc.) will fall under the scope of 
the freedom of establishment. However, regarding generic legislation, it 
has been hard to define a red line in the judgments from the ECJ. 
Moreover, for a long time it seemed that the facts of the case-rule would 
have importance in determining the relevant freedom in those cases, 
together with the purpose of the legislation-rule.219 
 
However, in 2009 several AG’s started to oppose this unforeseeable and 
inconsistent case law in their opinions and from 2010 the purpose of the 
legislation-rule was used more and more at the expense of the facts of 
the case-rule. In 2012 in the FII (II) judgment the ECJ finally clarified 
the case law and observed that when third parties are not involved the 
facts of the case-rule will still be applied on generic legislation. 
However, when those parties are part of the case, the purpose of the 
legislation-rule is the only rule that will be applied and the free 
movement of capital will always be the relevant freedom except for 
when the relevant legislation only confers definite influence. 
Consequently, the ECJ has shifted positions and provided more leeway 
to apply the free movement of capital and as an effect of this the ECJ 
sometimes observes that the freedom of establishment is merely an 
unavoidable consequence of the free movement of capital and not the 
opposite as was the case in older case law.220 Moreover, in line with the 
TFEU and the Felixstowe judgment it is important to note that persons 
indirectly held by third parties will still be considered MS parties. The 
current case law of the ECJ of which of the two freedoms national 
regulations will fall can be seen in the graph below. 
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It is the definite influence-rule that decides to what extent third parties 
may be part of the internal market. Moreover, because of that the crucial 
question of what legislation confers definite influence will be discussed 
below in this chapter. Furthermore, as the grandfather clause has a 
potential to restrict the reach of the free movement of capital when third 
parties are involved it will be examined in the following chapter. 
Moreover, after this a discussion will follow on the topics of whether the 
free movement of capital has a different reach when third parties are 
involved. Additionally, I will also examine if a wide reach of the free 
movement of capital will provide any negative consequences and the 
ECJ case law’s effect on national courts. Finally, I will in the final 
remarks make a summary of the current legal position in this field and 
the findings of this thesis. 
6.2 What factors confer definite 
influence? 
6.2.1 General remarks 
It is not easy to interpret exactly how the ECJ determines if a national 
legislation confers definite influence in borderline cases. Moreover, 
pertaining generic national legislation the national legislation seldom 
contains information on what parties are covered by the scope of the 
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** According to the current case-law leg islation that requires a 25 percent holding 
seems to confer definite influence and a requirement of 10 percent does certainly not 
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legislation and the purpose of the concerned measures. Historically the 
ECJ has in some of these cases occasionally relied on the facts of the 
case-rule instead.  
 
However, after a more thorough research of a legislations preparatory 
work, national agencies and departments’ interpretation of national 
legislation might render that it would be easier to determine the purpose 
of the legislation. Moreover, this would be easier done by a national 
court than by the ECJ and as the Court comments in the joint Haribo and 
Salinen joint cases the ECJ might only consider facts that has been 
provided to the ECJ. However, with a more clear case law in this field 
from the ECJ there might be more room for national courts to, without 
referring a case to the ECJ, render judgments and hence further 
examining the purpose of the concerned national legislation in a way that 
the ECJ is unable to.   
 
However, the ECJ and the AG in the SGI opinion have put relevance to 
other facts than the extent of a holding if it has been possible. By way of 
example, in the Idryma Typou judgment the ECJ observed that 
journalists might have a purpose of exerting definite influence. In the 
DMC judgment the ECJ observed that the purpose of the concerned 
legislation was to protect the fiscal interests of the home state and as 
such did not confer definite influence and in the Glaxo Wellcome case 
the purpose of hindering undue tax advantages did not exert definite 
influence. However, the wordings are vague since most tax legislation 
has the purpose of avoiding undue tax advantages and protecting the 
fiscal interest. The AG in the SGI opinion observed that in factual 
situations also factors such as technologies, relationships between 
owners, board members etc. should be taken into consideration and the 
ECJ in its judgment took concern of management ties between the 
companies at issue.  
 
If a national measure contains information on who it applies to this is 
often in the form of that it only applies to a certain extent to a 
shareholding. Consequently, the ECJ case law also heavily relies on 
what extent of a holding a certain national legislation requires to apply. 
As of now it is uncertain if the FII (II) case has provided a case law 
which has decreased the requirement for when a definite influence will 
exist to compensate for the extended reach of the free movement of 
capital. However, in the Itelcar judgment the ECJ confirmed its old case 
law that a legislation that requires a 10 percent holding does not confer 
definite influence.  
 
A legislation that required a 25 percent holding conferred definite 
influence in the Idryma Typou, Lasertec and Scheunemann cases. 
However, in the latter two cases the ECJ in the end concluded that there 
was also a factual definite influence. In the Idryma Typou case the ECJ 
observed that legislation requiring a 25 percent holding to apply could 
confer definite influence considering how the other 75 percent were held 
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which means that the ECJ in Idryma Typou also examined the factual 
circumstances in the case. Moreover, Ohlsson observes that the threshold 
for legislation to confer definite influence is between 10 and 25 percent 
and refers to the Itelcar and Scheunemann cases. Moreover, Cordewener 
also observes, based on the Lasertec case, that a 25 percent requirement 
confers definite influence, and that threshold might be loved if other 
circumstances are considered. However, they do not comment on the 
issue of the ECJ’s observation of the factual definite influence in the end 
of those cases. However, since in Idryma Typou a 25 percent 
requirement also confers definite the threshold is probably not higher 
than that. However, there is no exact threshold for when a national 
legislation will confer definite influence and therefore an MS cannot 
enact legislation that will, by little margin, only cover MS parties. It is 
important to bear in mind that the ECJ will also consider other factors 
than sheer percentage if possible.  
6.2.2 Regarding groups of companies 
Legislation that aims at only applying on groups of companies such as 
thin cap, CFC, transfer pricing, group taxation etc. also normally aims at 
circumstances that would confer definite influence. This is since such a 
corporate group often forms a single economic entity and the 
subsidiaries and parents form a common source of control. However, 
there are doubtful cases where definition of groups of companies has 
been wide, by way of example the recent Itelcar judgment.  Moreover, 
as such it is important to note that just because a certain national law 
states that it applies solely to circumstances covering groups of 
companies do not mean that it really is that way. For example, as 
Câmara observes, in the Itelcar case the regulations were called thin cap 
law and its purpose was to prevent certain types of thin capitalization 
related tax planning. However, the concerned legislation was wider than 
traditional thin cap regulations and naturally it thus did not only confer 
definite influence since it was applied to all holdings of 10 percent if 
there were a certain amount of thin capitalization. The Felixstowe 
judgment brings similar considerations and is discussed above under 
4.3.3.2 because of its relevance to the facts of the case-rule. Finally, it is 
important to note that also legislation that does not aim at groups of 
companies may confer definite influence, for example the Scheunemann 
case that concerned inheritance tax.  
6.3  The grandfather clause 
The grandfather clause has only been applied in a total of five direct tax 
cases by the ECJ and out of these cases three have been examined in this 
thesis.222 Only in one of those did the ECJ consider the concerned 
holding as a direct investment. As the clause as of now only has been 
applied in few cases, which might be a result of the scarcity of ECJ case 
                                                 
222
 C-446/04 FII (I), C-157/05  Holböck , C-436/08 & C-437/08 Haribo & Salinen. 
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law concerning third parties and the free movement of capital, it is hard 
to know its true scope. However, the concerned ECJ case law provides 
that the scope is not wide. 
 
Nijkeuter observes that in most cases the grandfather clause will not be 
relevant because it does not apply in majority interests with the purpose 
of a portfolio investment and this is supported by the directive,223 the 
TFEU and some case law224. However, because the ECJ does not apply 
the facts of the case-rule in cases concerning third parties anymore it is 
likely that the clause will be applied in cases that would prior to the FII 
(II) case be ruled in the view of the freedom of establishment according 
to the facts of the case-rule as that rule is still applied to examine if the 
grandfather clause is applicable. Furthermore, in the Holböck case a two 
thirds holding was enough for the clause to apply. Moreover, if the 
concerned legislation only applies on minor holdings the factual 
circumstances, naturally, also do not constitute direct investments, such 
as in the Haribo and Salinen joint cases. 
 
To conclude it is clear that the grandfather clause is limited to a 
restricted amount of circumstances but still has a pivotal role in this field 
since it limits the scope of the free movement of capital for third parties, 
the same scope that has been extended since the FII (II) judgment.   
6.4 The scope of the free movement of 
capital and third markets 
The TFEU provides that capital movements involving third parties are 
subject to different regulations than if only MS parties are involved, 
most notably the grandfather clause. Furthermore, the ECJ has 
previously observed that in some particular circumstances third parties 
act in a different legal market but generally the difference seems slim, 
especially since the ECJ has consistently rejected any lack of reciprocity 
arguments. Later case law in this field does not support a view that the 
free movement of capital should have a lesser scope when third parties 
are involved. 225 Moreover, it seems more the opposite since the FII (II) 
judgment stretched the scope of the free movements of capital when 
third parties are involved.  
                                                 
223
 Directive 88/361/EEC. 
224
 C-446/04 FII (I), C-157/05 Holböck , C-436/08 & C-437/08 Haribo & Salinen. 
225
 However, it must be noted that the FII (II) case might have extended the leeway for 
MS to invoke justifications, nonetheless this discussion falls outside the scope of this 
thesis, see also this thesis foot. 40, foot. 82, foot. 87, foot. 125 & foot. 188.  
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6.5 The potential risk of the 
advancement of capital movements 
Terra and Smit observe that a too wide scope of the free movement of 
capital would run contrary to fundamental interests of the EU, for 
example negotiating free trade treaties inside and outside of the WTO. 
Moreover, this risk occurs because of the lack of reciprocity. However, 
as the ECJ observers it is the MS themselves that has extended the free 
movement of capital to also cover third parties and they should have 
been aware of this when they did that. Moreover, the free movement of 
capital is restricted by both the dominance rule and the grandfather 
clause.  
 
To conclude, this risk is political and is the responsibility of the 
legislators, not the ECJ. However, the ECJ seems to be concerned of 
third parties benefiting from the internal market since it was the Court 
that developed the dominance rule. Moreover, in all cases, except the 
grandfathered Holböck case, where the ECJ has deviated from this rule 
no third parties has been involved. 
 
Nonetheless, I do not think that it is only negative that third parties are 
covered by a wide scope of the free movement of capital. This is since it 
might provide incentives for third parties when they are protected from 
restrictions to invest in the inner market and as such improve the 
European economy. 
6.6 Considerations of the national 
situation and the ECJ case law 
National courts have mainly been inconsistent regarding the choice 
between the purpose of the legislation-rule and the facts of the case-rule. 
This has led to different national courts ruling differently on these issues. 
This is probably the result of what this thesis has proven that the ECJ 
cases law on this issue has not been consistent in the past. However, as 
such the national courts must refer the cases to the ECJ and if this is not 
done it is obvious that diverging national courts will create even more 
uncertainty and legal uncertainty for MS persons. Moreover, as such not 
solely the ECJ can be blamed for this inconsistency on a national level.  
 
However, it is my view that considering the FII (II) judgment, it is an 
acte clair that the purpose of the legislation-rule will be applied when 
third parties are involved and that the freedom of establishment will only 
be applied in those cases if the concerned national regulations only 
confer definite influence. Moreover, this provides more leeway - for 
national courts to render decisions without first consulting the ECJ, even 
if more case- law is needed on other relevant areas. By way of example 
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more exact guidelines for national courts on when a national legislation 
confers definite influence. 
 
Regarding the newly enacted Swedish thin cap rules the European 
Commission chose to complain under the freedom of establishment. I do 
not think that this should be interpreted as if the Commission supports an 
extension of the freedom of establishment but that that litigation is in its 
early stages and that the Swedish rules mostly applies to groups of 
companies and that the they most likely will require an ownership of 
more than 25 percent to apply. 
6.7 Final remarks 
The ECJ case- law in this field has almost always provided that national 
legislation that only covers portfolio investments will fall under the free 
movement of capital and legislation that only confers definite influence 
will fall under the freedom of establishment. However, in the past the 
ECJ case law concerning generic legislation has been characterized by 
inconsistency mostly regarding if the facts of the case-rule or the 
purpose of the legislation-rule should determine definite influence.  
Nonetheless, there has also been inconsistency regarding the standpoint 
of the dominance rule and the definite influence-rule. 
 
However, the more clear current legal position is that only one freedom 
can be applied and that freedom is dominant. When third parties are 
involved the freedom of establishment will only be the relevant freedom 
if the concerned national legislation solely confers definite influence, 
under all other circumstances (such as generic measures) the free 
movement of capital will be the relevant freedom. Moreover, because of 
the recent consistent case regarding this issue I see this is an acte clair. 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the facts of the case-rule will be 
applied when determining whether the grandfather clause applies and 
that clause might have a more major role in the future to restrict third 
parties from invoking the free movement of capital. Furthermore, the 
ECJ in its current case- law involving third parties also examines if third 
parties are piggybacking on the free movement of capital to benefit from 
the freedom of establishment. However, this is a situation that will most 
probably never occur because of the ECJs’ restrictive wording in these 
clauses.  Nonetheless, even if the facts of the case-rule has lost its 
importance in cases involving third parties it will still be applied when 
dividends are distributed within the inner market if a national legislation 
the generic. Furthermore, this rule might also be applied concerning 
other types of direct taxation when third parties are not involved. 
Nonetheless, this distinction is not of great importance since there is no 
practical difference between the two freedoms when third parties are not 
involved. 
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The threshold for when legislation confers definite influence is probably 
around 25 percent. However, this requirement might be lower 
considering other aspects such as the type of the concerned of 
regulations and what kind of persons it intends to cover. Nonetheless, a 
10 percent requirement to apply will not confer definite influence.  
 
It seems like the current objective of the ECJ will be that as many parties 
as possible should be able to invoke EU law while maintaining the 
dominance-rule.  This recent method of determining if legislation 
confers definite influence provides a much more foreseeable case law 
than before and as such makes it easier for legislators and law 
practitioners to examine which freedom should be relevant under certain 
circumstances. Furthermore, the FII (II) case while undoubtedly 
extending the reach of the free movement of capital does not in any way 
severely reduce the use of the freedom of establishment and open the 
Pandora’s Box for third parties to benefit from the third market. 
Moreover, since the ECJ consistently applies the dominance rule in later 
case-law it still provides less use of the free movement of capital than 
might have been the idea behind the TFEU.  
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Supplement A                             
Overview of the ECJ judgments 
discussed in this thesis226 
Name Rule227 Circumstances 
Freedom 
examined Third parties Grandfather228 
Safety 
clause229 Chapter 
C-524/04  Thin cap  purpose GOC230 leg., factual def inf.  Establishment No No No 4.3.1 
C-492/04 Lasertec 
Facts231 + 
purpose GOC leg. 25 %, factual def inf. Establishment Yes  No No 4.3.1 
C-157/05 Holböck Purpose Generic leg, factual def inf.  
Capital + 
establishment Yes  Yes  No 4.3.1 
C-231/05 OY AA 
Facts + 
purpose GOC leg., factual def inf.  Establishment No No No 4.3.1 
C-298/05 Columbus 
Facts + 
purpose Generic leg., factual def inf.  
Capital + 
establishment No No No 3.3.2 
C-105/07 Lammers Purpose Generic leg., unclear factual circ.  
Capital + 
establishment No No No 3.3.2 
C-284/06 Burda 
Facts + 
purpose Directive  25 %, Factual def. inf.  Establishment No No No 4.2.1 
 C-282/07 Truck center 
Facts + 
purpose GOC leg 25 %, factual def inf.  
Capital + 
establishment No No No 3.3.2 
 C-439/07 KBC  
Facts + 
purpose Generic leg., factual def inf.  Establishment Yes  No No 4.2.1 
C-303/07 Aberdeen  
Facts + 
purpose 
Generic leg., factual def inf. 
Leg. 20 %, factual def inf. Establishment No No No 4.2.1 
C-182/08 Glaxo  Purpose Generic leg., factual def inf.  Capital No No No 3.4.4 
 C-247/08 Gaz  Purpose Generic leg., factual def inf.  
Capital + 
establishment No No No 3.3.2 
C-311/08 SGI 
Facts + 
purpose Generic leg., factual  def inf. Establishment No No No 4.2.1 
C-81/09  Idryma Purpose 
Leg. 2,5 % & 25 %, applied on 
journalists, unclear factual circ.  
Capital + 
establishment No No No 4.3.1 
C-436/08 Haribo Purpose Leg. 10 % Capital Yes  Yes  No 4.3.1 
C-310/09 Accor  Purpose232 
Leg. under 10 %, unclear factual 
circ. 
Capital + 
establishment No No No 3.3.2 
C-31/11 Scheunemann  
Facts + 
purpose Leg. 25 %, factual def inf.  Establishment Yes  No No 4.3.1 
C-35/11 FII (II)  Purpose Generic leg., factual def inf.  Capital Yes  No Yes  5.2.1 
C-168/11 Beker 
Facts + 
purpose Generic leg. no factual def inf.  Capital Yes 233 No No 5.3 
C-282/12 Itelcar Purpose 
Thin cap leg. 10 %, factual def 
Inf. Capital Yes  No Yes  5.3 
C-164/12 DMC Purpose Generic leg. Factual def inf.  Capital No No No 5.3 
C-80/12 Felixstowe 
Facts + 
purpose GOC legislation, factual def inf.  Establishment No No No 3.4.3 
C-190/12 DFA Purpose Generic leg, no factual def inf.  Capital Yes  No Yes  5.3 
                                                 
226 The cases in this table are from 2007 and onwards and inserted in chronological order.  
227 If the purpose of the legislation-rule or the facts of the case-rule was examined (see chapter 4), 
the purpose of the legislation-rule is inserted before the facts of the case-rule. 
228 If the grandfather clause was discussed in the case (it was only applied in Holböck). 
229 The safety / anti-abuse clause (see above 5.2.3). 
230 Groups of companies. 
231 As the purpose of the legislation-rule always is applied to determine the concerned legislation 
constitutes a specific or generic measure the facts of the case-rule will never be applied on its 
own. 
232 The ECJ observed that the factual circumstances were unclear.  
233 The ECJ only applied the facts of the case-rule when the third parties were not involved. 
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